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ABSTRACT 
 
Interdependent Infrastructures and Multi-Mode Attacks and Failures: Improving the 
Security of Urban Water Systems and Fire Response.  (December 2006) 
Elizabeth Catherine Bristow, B.S., Texas A&M University; 
M. Eng., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Kelly Brumbelow 
 
 
  This dissertation examines the interdependence between urban water distribution 
systems and urban fire response.  The focus on interdependent critical infrastructures is 
driven by concern for security of water systems and the effects on related infrastructures 
if water distribution systems are damaged by terrorist attack or natural disaster. 
A model of interdependent infrastructures (principally water distribution systems 
and fire response) is developed called the Model of Urban Fire Spread (MUFS).  The 
model includes the capacity to simulate firefighting water demands in a community 
water system hydraulic model, building-to-building urban fire spread, and suppression 
activities.   MUFS is an improvement over previous similar models because it allows 
simulation of urban fires at the level of individual buildings and it permits simulation of 
interdependent infrastructures working in concert.   
MUFS is used to simulate a series of multi-mode attacks and failures (MMAFs) – 
events which disable the water distribution system and simultaneously ignite an urban 
fire.  The consequences of MMAF scenarios are analyzed to determine the most serious 
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modes of infrastructure failure and urban fire ignition.  Various methods to determine 
worst-case configurations of urban fire ignition points are also examined. 
 These MMAF scenarios are used to inform the design of potential mitigation 
measures to decrease the consequences of the urban fire.  The effectiveness of mitigation 
methods is determined using the MUFS simulation tool.  Novel  metrics are developed to 
quantify the effectiveness of the mitigation methods from the time-series development of 
their consequences.  A cost-benefit analysis of the various mitigation measures is 
conducted to provide additional insight into the methods’ effectiveness and better inform 
the decision-making process of selecting mitigation methods. 
 Planned future work includes further refinement of the representation of fire 
propagation and suppression in MUFS and investigation of historical MMAF events to 
validate simulation predictions.  Future efforts will continue development of appropriate 
optimization methods for determining worst-case MMAF scenarios. 
 This work should be of interest to water utility managers and emergency 
planners, who can adapt the methodology to analyze their communities’ vulnerability to 
MMAFs and design mitigation techniques to meet their unique needs, as well as to 
researchers interested in infrastructure modeling and disaster simulation. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 The study presented in this dissertation has three primary goals.  The first is to 
develop a compound model of urban fire spread and suppression with a damaged water 
distribution system.  The study’s second goal is to use this model to examine the 
consequences of complex attacks or disasters which simultaneously disable a 
community’s water distribution system and start an urban fire.  Once the worst-
consequence disaster scenarios are known, the study’s third goal is to use the joint water 
distribution system/fire suppression model to test the effectiveness of mitigation and 
security strategies designed to protect communities from simultaneous failures of critical 
infrastructures which contribute to fire response.   
 Policymakers and researchers have long been aware of the importance of critical 
infrastructures to the health and integrity of modern societies.  Many sources (Clinton 
1998, USA PATRIOT Act [P.L. 107-56], Office of Homeland Security [OHS] 2002, 
President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board [PCIPB] 2003) present lists of the 
infrastructures which are most critical to society’s operation.  The lists may vary slightly, 
but water distribution systems and emergency response (of which firefighting is a 
component) are common entries.   
 The increased focus on security after the events of September 11, 2001 prompted 
recognition of the complex interactions among critical infrastructures and the potential 
for cascading failures where these systems depend on one another.  The National 
Research and Development Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Executive  
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Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy [OSTP] and U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate [DHS-S&T] 
2004) states that: 
 
[A] coordinated attack by a small army of arsonists could wreak havoc on a 
community and completely drain water supplies needed to extinguish it, 
especially if those water supply networks were also attacked.  (p. 32) 
 
To counter the potential for this type of tandem attack, this strategy calls explicitly for 
advanced modeling and simulation efforts to provide better insight into the complex, 
nonlinear interactions of interdependent infrastructures.  The strategy emphasizes the 
important benefits of developing advanced models of interdependent critical 
infrastructures by stating that: 
 
 This capability can be used in a crisis response mode, and in an analysis and 
assessment mode to provide decision-makers with a better basis to make prudent, 
strategic investments and policy resolutions to improve the security of 
infrastructures. (p. 49) 
 
 This statement underlines the most important benefit of the joint water 
distribution system/fire suppression model and risk analysis methodology presented in 
this dissertation: to permit policymakers, utility managers, and emergency planners to 
examine the potential consequences of complex attacks or disasters in their own 
communities and to develop mitigation and response plans in advance of these disasters.  
These strategies will vary for each system, since each will be tailored to its specific 
community’s conditions and needs.  It is hoped, however, that the model and 
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methodology presented here may provide useful tools and guidance in crafting these 
strategies. 
 This research is presented and discussed in greater detail in the remaining seven 
sections of this dissertation.  Section 2 presents an overview of the existing literature on 
the security of water systems and their interdependence with fire response.  This section 
also presents existing literature on urban fire spread and suppression models. 
 Section 3 gives a detailed explanation of the technical workings of the Model of 
Urban Fire Spread (MUFS), a tandem model of fire spread and suppression run in 
conjunction with a hydraulic model of a damaged water distribution system, which was 
developed for this dissertation.  MUFS is used to simulate the progress and suppression 
of urban fires under various scenarios of damage to a community water distribution 
network as part of an extensive vulnerability analysis against events which 
simultaneously damage a community’s water system and start an urban fire.  This type 
of situation is described generically as a multi-mode attack or failure (MMAF).  
 Section 4 presents the methodology for this coupled water system damage/urban 
fire vulnerability assessment.  Section 5 includes the results of the MMAF vulnerability 
assessment and a discussion of the outcomes of the extensive MMAF simulations. 
 Based on the results of the vulnerability analysis and MMAF damage scenario 
simulations, mitigation strategies are developed and tested using the MUFS model.  The 
methodology for modeling and testing the damage scenarios is presented in Section 6.  
The results of the MMAF damage simulations with mitigation measures in place are 
discussed in Section 7.  The final section of the dissertation will present the conclusions 
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gained from the study and a summary of the suggested future work on this topic.  This 
discussion will include planned improvements to the MUFS model and suggestions for 
future work on integrating models of interdependent critical infrastructures.  
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2.  REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
 
2.1. Vulnerability of Water Systems to Terrorist Attacks 
 National leaders have long been aware of the strategic importance of water 
systems to maintain the economy and stability of the United States.  In Presidential 
Decision Directive (PDD) 63 (Clinton 1998), President William J. Clinton formally 
designated water systems as part of the nation’s critical infrastructure: “those physical 
and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and 
government.”  In the same document, the President pointed out that these infrastructures’ 
strategic importance makes them vulnerable to asymmetric attacks by nations or groups 
intent on harming the United States.  PDD 63 also presents a timeline for analyzing 
vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures and developing strategies to increase their 
security and robustness.  Although this directive does mention terrorism as a motivation 
for critical infrastructure protection, its main emphasis lies on decreasing the impact of 
accidental mechanical and electrical failures due to the effects of the Y2K bug on the 
critical infrastructures’ supporting computer systems.   
 The importance of protecting the nation’s critical infrastructures from terrorism 
was reaffirmed in 2001 with the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act (PL 107-56).  
Section 1016 of this act, also known as the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2001, 
explicitly named water systems as a component of the critical infrastructure and 
redefines this term to encompass “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so 
vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets 
6 
 
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public 
health or safety, or any combination of those matters” (Title X, Section 1016e).  This 
Act also established the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center to assist 
in threat assessment, risk mitigation, and counterterrorism activities.   
 This shift in attention from simple mechanical or electronic failures to 
premeditated, malicious attacks requires an accompanying shift in the types of 
vulnerabilities judged to be important.  The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness Act of 2002 (PL 107-88) states that “each community water system 
serving a population of greater than 3,300 persons shall conduct an assessment of the 
vulnerability of its system to a terrorist attack or other intentional acts intended to 
substantially disrupt the ability of the system to provide a safe and reliable supply of 
drinking water” (Title IV, Section 1433, a(1)).  This Act established deadlines for the 
completion of the vulnerability assessments and promised future guidance on the types 
of attacks to be considered.  Since this Act’s institution, many different sources have 
published documents elucidating the types of threats that water systems may face. 
 The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and 
Key Assets (PCIPB 2003) cites four primary concerns for water systems’ vulnerabilities: 
physical damage to water system components, contamination of the water supply, cyber-
attack in information management systems used by the water system, and interruption of 
water services by another infrastructure’s failure.   
 Mays (2004) closely echoes this assessment by presenting the following list of 
potential threats: cyber-based threats, physical threats, and contamination of drinking 
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water using biological or chemical means.  Clark et al. (2004) expand on this by 
delineating the components of water systems which may be vulnerable to attack: raw 
water sources, raw water conveyance systems, water treatment facilities, inflow points to 
the water distribution system, pumping stations and valves, and treated-water storage 
facilities like tanks and reservoirs.  Clark et al. present contamination as the most serious 
threat against water systems and state that, with few exceptions, physical destruction of 
water infrastructure may be expensive and inconvenient but does not present severe 
public safety risks. 
 The American Water Works Association has provided perhaps the most 
extensive list of potential threats in its guidance document for the security of water 
utilities (AWWA 2004).  In addition to those listed by previous documents, the AWWA 
list includes such threats as arson against water facilities, release of toxic substances like 
chlorine gas from water treatment facilities, and the threat of water contamination to 
evoke public fear.   
 Terrorism vulnerability assessments for water systems are a relatively new 
concept, and data contributing to precise vulnerability quantifications are not widely 
available.  Tidwell et al. (2005) present a methodology for modeling water system 
vulnerability to terrorist attacks using a variation of Markov chain modeling to 
incorporate the “latent effects” of security strategies and the utility’s “company culture” 
regarding security. 
 Few sources directly examine multi-mode attacks or failures (MMAFs) involving 
water systems and fire response, but a recent article containing an interview of a 
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terrorism expert points out the possibility of this type of attack and the importance of 
water systems’ preparation for it (“Taking Due Account of Terrorism,” 2004). 
 Regardless of the precise listing of potential threats, it is clear that water systems 
occupy a strategic place in the nation’s day-to-day operations and that their status as 
critical infrastructures makes water systems attractive targets for terrorist attack.  Less 
comprehensively examined, however, is the extent to which water systems’ 
interdependence with other critical infrastructures increases the vulnerability of these 
systems to intentional multi-mode attacks or collateral damage.  Critical infrastructures’ 
interdependence is discussed in the following section. 
 
2.2. Interdependence of Water Systems with Other Critical Infrastructures 
 Extensive work has been done on exploring water systems’ intrinsic vulnerability 
and predicting the direct threats against them.  The very first modern work on critical 
infrastructure protection, PDD 63, points out another concern that has been less 
thoroughly studied.  The nation’s critical infrastructures are, in many cases, physically 
intertwined and operationally interdependent; therefore, while the consequences of water 
systems’ incapacitation or contamination are grave, they may be even more so in light of 
their effects on other critical infrastructures.   
 Perrow (1984) introduces the concept of “normal accidents” in his book of the 
same title.  A normal accident is one which is caused by unexpected system interactions, 
not by operator error or mechanical failure of a component.  Such accidents, Perrow 
states, are unavoidable and cannot be mitigated by elaborate safety systems or 
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automation; indeed, these added systems create even more complex system interactions 
and tend to exacerbate the problem, not fix it.  The system’s interactive complexity, or 
its tendency for separate subsystems to interact in unpredictable ways, is one factor 
which contributes to normal accidents; the other factor named is “tight coupling,” or the 
tendency of system processes to happen very quickly, with little opportunity for 
intervention.  Some technologies’ very nature makes them dangerous, Perrow states; in 
some cases designers can reduce the risk by decreasing the complex interactions and 
tight coupling of systems; in other cases, society must learn to accept a certain level of 
expected risk or be willing to abandon the technology altogether. 
 Zimmerman (2001) expands Perrow’s thesis of complexity leading to unforeseen 
consequences, placing it in the context of recent terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and 
technological failures which led to significant infrastructure outages.  She notes that 
interdependencies among infrastructures permit problems to propagate and examines 
two different types of infrastructure connections.  These types are spatial 
interconnectedness, in which infrastructures are affected by the same events because 
they are located very close to one another, and functional interconnectedness, in which 
infrastructures are linked because one is directly dependent upon another for normal 
operations.  Zimmerman proposes several strategies for overcoming the problems 
associated with interdependency: system redundancy, increased study of unpredictable 
system interactions, and improved technology for early detection of problems with the 
infrastructure.   
10 
 
 Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly (2001) further develop this idea of various types 
of coupling among critical infrastructures by introducing six dimensions along which 
researchers may describe infrastructure interactions.  The first, “Coupling and Response 
Behavior,” echoes Perrow’s notion of tight vs. loose coupling of system interactions.  
The other dimensions of this conceptual model characterize the infrastructures’ 
characteristics: their state of operation (normal vs. stressed), the environment in which 
they operate, the types of interactions which may take place between them, and the types 
of failures which may arise from emergencies involving interdependent infrastructures.  
The authors propose this model in order to encourage other researchers and 
infrastructure managers to consider many different aspects of their systems when 
modeling the systems’ interdependencies.  The model they propose, therefore, is 
descriptive rather than quantitative. 
 Brown et al. (2004) present an algorithm for assessing vulnerabilities of water 
systems deriving from infrastructure interdependencies.  This model is primarily 
concerned with natural disasters affecting water and electrical grids but presents a 
general framework which is adaptable to other infrastructure pairings.  The algorithm 
begins with a “quick-look” assessment which uses whatever system information is 
readily available to identify potential risks.  A conceptual model of the system is then 
developed to determine the probability and consequences of these risks, as well as the 
immediacy of the threats they pose.  The threat scenarios are prioritized for urgency of 
mitigation efforts by plotting each potential risk on a two-dimensional graph, with the 
likelihood of the event on one axis and the magnitude of its consequences on the other 
11 
 
axis.  The model they present can be used to approximate the economic and system –
operations impact of various policy decisions as well. 
 Haimes and Jiang (2001) present the most quantitatively-based model of 
infrastructure interdependency examined here.  This model is based on an economic 
technique called Leiontief Input-Output modeling for studying the equilibrium behavior 
of interconnected economic sectors; Haimes and Jiang adapted the methodology to apply 
to dynamic analyses of interdependent infrastructures.  Given a failure in one or more 
infrastructures due to accidents, natural disasters, or terrorism, the model predicts the 
risk of inoperability for the other infrastructures.  The model also takes into account 
“rescue” techniques used to repair damage to one or more affected infrastructures and 
the mitigative effects the efforts may have on related infrastructures.  The main 
challenge in applying this model lies in constructing the matrices that describe the 
degree of infrastructure interdependence and the rate of propagation of cascading 
failures.  The paper uses Hierarchical Holographic Modeling (Haimes 2004) to assist in 
building the matrices, though the paper is not explicit regarding the precise techniques 
used.  The authors also present a series of illustrative examples of applying the 
interdependency analysis algorithm. 
 
2.3. Computational Fire Spread Models 
 Infrastructure interdependence is a widespread condition, and infrastructure 
managers may legitimately be concerned with a variety of types of interdependencies.  
One relationship of particular importance to the water industry exists between municipal 
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water distribution systems and fire response services.  Few investigators have yet 
examined the extent of this interdependence and modeled the potential consequences of 
cascading failure in this area.  A good first step in examining this phenomenon is to 
study how fire spreads and how fire-response systems restrict fire.  The literature 
presents several quantitative models of fire spread, and Friedman (1992) provides a 
comprehensive overview of early computer-based fire spread models.  Most of these 
models focus on fire spread within a single room or a single multi-compartment 
building. 
 
2.3.1. Compartment Fire Spread 
 Mitler and Emmons (1981) provide a good description of the physics of fire 
spread within a single compartment in their documentation for CFC V (Computer Fire 
Code, Version 5), an early single-room fire propagation model developed at Harvard 
University.  The model tracks fire progress by calculating temperature in the room and 
by performing mass balance analyses between the two layers of the room’s atmosphere: 
a lower layer containing air under normal conditions, and an upper layer containing 
smoke, soot, and other combustion byproducts at elevated temperatures.  The mass and 
heat transfer equations are based on observations of controlled fires and will account for 
specific object placement within a room.  This version, in an improvement over previous 
versions of the same model, permits the addition of ambient air through vertical vents in 
the compartment’s ceiling.   
13 
 
 CFC V was developed for the National Bureau of Standards, which later became 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).  NIST continued developing 
fire-spread models and later adopted CFAST, the Consolidated Model of Fire Growth 
and Smoke Transport (Peacock et al. 1988).  Like CFC V, CFAST divides each room 
into an upper and lower zone based on air-layer properties; in an advance over previous 
models, however, CFAST supports multiple fires in multi-room buildings and will 
approximate fire travel through ventilation ducts between rooms.   
 Platt (1992) introduces a new approach to modeling multicompartment fire 
propagation: a stochastic model with probabilities of each type of fire spread derived 
from the properties of the surrounding materials.  This model permits three means of fire 
spread between compartments: listed in order of decreasing probability, they are: spread 
through an open door, vertical spread between floors via flames projecting out windows, 
and horizontal or vertical spread through closed doors, walls, or ceilings.   
 Karlsson and Quintiere (2000) provide an excellent qualitative treatment of 
compartment fire development and mechanics as well as a good overview of recent 
developments in computer models of compartment fires. 
 Earlier fire spread models concentrated on single-room or single-building fire 
spread because there is less uncertainty in the expected conditions.  However, the 
literature also includes several studies examining urban fire spread – that is, fire spread 
between buildings, rather than within buildings – and these models are valuable to any 
consideration of the interaction between water systems and municipal fire response 
services. 
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2.3.2. Urban Fire Spread 
 The seminal work in the study of urban fire spread was based on large urban fires 
following earthquakes in Japan (Hamada 1955, cited in Fujita 1975).  Hamada’s 
equations were derived empirically from historical earthquake-caused fires and relate 
velocity of fire spread to wind speed, plan dimension of a (square) building, and 
separation distance between the buildings.  This model formed the foundation for many 
later models.  Fujita (1975) combined Hamada’s equations with a study of pedestrian 
evacuation from the fires to aid cities in creating effective emergency response 
strategies.   
 The Hamada equations also form the foundation for the post-earthquake fire 
module of HAZUS-MH (FEMA 2003a, 2003b), a software program designed by the 
U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency to perform risk assessments and damage 
estimations for earthquakes, floods, and high winds.  The post-earthquake fire module 
models fire spread and suppression and accounts for the time it takes residents to 
discover and report the fire as well as the potential for partially- or totally-disabled 
municipal water systems for firefighting.  The density of fire ignition points is based on 
the intensity of the earthquake and is modeled empirically from historical post-
earthquake fires.  HAZUS-MH’s Fire Following Earthquake module is discussed in 
greater detail in Section 3.2.   
 Other modern fire spread models have moved away from the approach specified 
by the Hamada equations.  Himoto and Tanaka (2000) point out that the Hamada 
equations’ applicability may have declined, since they were based on statistical data 
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involving building size, shape, layout, and construction which were valid in large cities 
in Japan half a century ago but may not be accurate after the advent of modern building 
materials and fireproofing techniques.  Himoto and Tanaka present a more general 
physically-based model of post-earthquake fires that considers, building by building, the 
physics of fire propagation.  The authors model fire spread between buildings through 
radiative heat flux and hot air plumes from already-burning buildings.  Once a building 
has caught fire, its internal burning and contribution to heat flux in other buildings is 
modeled similarly to single-layer compartment fire models.  This model, which is 
acknowledged in the paper to be incomplete and not yet ready to deal with realistic 
urban conditions, was tested on a few simple three-building configurations. 
 A physically-based urban fire spread model is also presented by Bertinshaw and 
Guesgen (2004).  This model assumes that a city’s firefighting capabilities have been 
disabled by some unspecified disaster.  Given an ignition point for the fire, the GIS-
based model calculates for each unburned building the heat flux from its burning 
neighbors.  If the intensity of the heat transfer rises above a material-dependent threshold 
value, the unburned building ignites.  This calculation is carried out for every unburned 
building at each time step.  The model calculates heat flux following well-established 
laws of heat transfer.  The most complicated calculation is the “configuration factor,” an 
input to the heat transfer equation, which is a term that encompasses the sizes and 
distances of the faces of heat-emitting buildings.  Bertinshaw and Guesgen outline a 
means of calculating the configuration factor for each building but caution that this is the 
most computationally-intense aspect of the fire-spread simulation.  This model was 
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considered as a means of implementing the urban fire spread model for this research 
project; unfortunately, the model has never been tested against historical fire spread data, 
so its accuracy is unproven (Bertinshaw, personal communication, August 2005). 
 General mechanics of urban fire spread and water system needs to fight urban 
fires are dealt with by Mahoney (1980) and Eckman (1994).  Eckman (1994) discusses 
basic needs for water systems to provide water for firefighting, including sufficient 
pressure, elevated water storage for firefighting, hydrant spacing, and water shuttle relay 
operations when adequate in-ground water supplies are not available.  Mahoney (1980) 
presents a detailed guide to determining water pressure needs for the water distribution 
system under various topology and water requirement scenarios.  This work includes a 
discussion of complex fire truck deployments, including supplying more than one fire 
stream with the same fire truck and connecting fire trucks in series to overcome the 
difficulties posed by a weakened water distribution system or unusual water needs 
imposed by topographic concerns. 
 
2.4. Conclusion: Historical Multi-Mode Attacks and Failures 
 Review of historical literature also provides strong justification for continuing 
research into mitigation measures for multi-mode attacks and failures.  History provides 
many examples of large-scale urban fires whose suppression efforts were hampered by a 
disabled water distribution system.  Examples of historical MMAFs include the Great 
Earthquake and Fire of 1906 in San Francisco (Nolte 2006) and the Second Great Fire of 
London in 1940 (Johnson 1980).   
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3.  METHODOLOGY: MODEL OF URBAN FIRE SPREAD 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 The water distribution system vulnerability studies and mitigation assessment 
detailed later in this dissertation were conducted using the Model of Urban Fire Spread 
(MUFS), a numerical model of urban fire ignition, spread, and suppression which was 
developed specifically for this application.  This section presents MUFS in detail; it 
begins with a discussion of the reasons a new model of urban fire spread is needed and a 
view of the main differences between MUFS and existing models of urban fire spread.  
The section then discusses the needed inputs to MUFS and presents the model’s 
technical workings in detail.  The section concludes with a discussion of MUFS’s 
outputs and how they can be used to analyze urban fires and their consequences. 
 
3.1.1. Overview of Model Operation  
 Before beginning a detailed discussion of MUFS’s development and operation, it 
is useful to present a quick overview of the model and the stages in the simulation 
process.  The main goal of MUFS is to determine the extent of the burned area resulting 
from a single- or multi-ignition urban fire with water for fire suppression coming from a 
water distribution system that may be partially or totally disabled.  Coupled with 
information about the urban area’s building layout and occupancy, the burned area 
reveals the number of people who are displaced when the fire damages their home or 
place of employment.  The count of displaced people is used as the primary measure of 
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the consequences of the multi-mode attack or failure scenarios in the vulnerability 
assessment presented later in this dissertation.   
 The preliminary phase of the model requires the user to provide information 
about the urban area’s layout, its water distribution system, and its fire response 
capabilities.  MUFS requires more extensive inputs than many other urban fire spread 
models because MUFS’s output is highly dependent both on the topology of the urban 
area and the status of the water distribution system.  The required structure of these 
inputs is explained more thoroughly in Section 3.3.   
 The first step in the actual simulation process involves calculating the extent of 
unsuppressed fire spread in the time steps before the fire department arrives to begin fire 
suppression.  All fires start unsuppressed, since it takes some time for the fire 
department to be notified of the fire and to deploy resources to fight the fire.  The length 
of delay before the firefighters’ arrival depends on the status of the urban area’s 
communication and transportation infrastructures; this delay can be supplied as an input 
by the user or generated stochastically based on historical disaster response.  After the 
time of ignition, MUFS calculates fire propagation at discrete time steps, the length of 
which are specified by the user. 
 For both unsuppressed and suppressed fire spread, MUFS begins the fire spread 
calculations at an ignition point (or set of points) specified by the user.  At each time 
step, MUFS calculates the incremental distance covered by the fire during the time step 
in each of four cardinal fire spread directions determined relative to the dominant wind 
direction in the urban area: downwind, upwind, sidewind left, and sidewind right.  The 
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polygons created by linking the coordinates of the burn fronts at any particular time step 
are therefore quadrilaterals (Figure 3.1a). 
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Fig. 3.1.  Burned area quadrilaterals (3.1a, left) generated by MUFS and corresponding fire consequences 
(3.1 b, right) at 60-minute time step intervals.  
 
 After it has calculated the unsuppressed fire spread for the urban fire’s initial 
period, MUFS conducts simulations of suppressed fire spread beginning at the time 
when the fire department arrives and continuing to the end of the user-specified 
simulation period.  Firefighting efforts may completely stop the fire’s progress in one or 
more of the fire spread directions (totally effective suppression), or they may merely 
slow the rate of the fire’s spread (partially effective suppression).  The effectiveness of 
the firefighting depends on the number of fire trucks and amount of water available, and 
a technical explanation of how MUFS determines fire suppression effectiveness is 
presented in Section 3.5.   At each time step, the buildings encompassed by the final 
burn polygon are determined, and numbers of displaced persons are tabulated as a metric 
of the fire’s consequences (Figure 3.1b).  The output from MUFS’s simulation process is 
discussed in detail in Section 3.6. 
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3.2. Comparison of MUFS and HAZUS-MH Fire Following Earthquake Module 
 MUFS was developed specifically for the vulnerability assessment and 
consequence analysis presented in this dissertation.  In the original proposal for this 
study, the project plan stated that the vulnerability analysis would use the Fire Following 
Earthquake module of HAZUS-MH (FEMA 2003a, FEMA 2003b), a disaster analysis 
and planning tool developed by the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency that 
uses readily-available public data to predict the scope and consequences of a variety of 
natural disasters, including earthquakes and the urban fires they often ignite. 
This project has several unique requirements which ultimately made it infeasible 
to use HAZUS-MH for the vulnerability analysis.  HAZUS-MH’s treatment of urban 
fires is based on the Hamada model of urban fire spread, with the inclusion of additional 
empirical data from recent post-earthquake urban fires and the incorporation of a model 
of urban fire suppression (FEMA 2003a).  The basic framework of HAZUS-MH’s urban 
fire spread and suppression model was preserved, although some modifications of the 
model were necessary to make it appropriate to this study and to make full use of the 
geographic data available.  It is useful to consider the similarities and differences 
between HAZUS-MH’s Fire Following Earthquake model and MUFS in three areas: fire 
ignition, fire spread, and fire suppression. 
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3.2.1. Fire Ignition 
 HAZUS-MH was designed as a tool to predict aggregate damage from 
earthquakes and other natural disasters. Under normal HAZUS-MH operation, the urban 
fire’s ignition points are predicted based on a design earthquake event and 
geographically distributed automatically according to an empirical equation based on 
historical post-earthquake fires (FEMA 2003a).  It does not permit the simulation of 
post-earthquake fires independent of the earthquake that caused them, and the user may 
not specify fire ignition points.   
Simulating non-earthquake-caused urban fires calls for the ability to model fires 
with diverse ignition patterns, and for this reason it was necessary to improve the 
simulation of urban fire ignition.  MUFS permits the user to specify the fire’s ignition 
point(s), and the selection of these points depends on the type of MMAF being modeled.  
For example, a terrorist arson attack might center on local sites of importance, such as a 
museum or a school or City Hall, or it might focus on an area of the community where 
many people congregate, such as the central business district.  An industrial accident 
which sparks an urban fire would be located the town’s industrial district, and an urban 
fire begun by a domestic accident would begin in one of the town’s residential districts.  
Allowing the user to specify the ignition point permits MUFS to look beyond fires 
caused by natural disasters and to simulate urban fires caused by a variety of incidents. 
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3.2.2. Fire Spread 
 There are many similarities between the basic urban fire spread model in 
HAZUS-MH and the one included in MUFS.  Both models’ fire spread calculations are 
based on the Hamada model of fire spread discussed in Section 2; accordingly, both 
models predict the spatial extent of urban fires through time as a function of urban layout 
and wind speed and direction.  A major difference between the two models arises in how 
they determine building parameters as a function of urban topology.  The original 
Hamada equations include simplifying assumptions about the urban area’s layout and 
building spacing; they operate on an area composed of equally-sized, uniformly-spaced 
square buildings (Fujita 1975).  Thus, the parameters in the Hamada equations which 
capture the size and spacing of the buildings may be generalized for the entire area.   
Like the original Hamada model, HAZUS-MH uses average values for the urban 
area (FEMA 2003a).  MUFS utilizes geographical information commonly available in 
modern GIS databases of urban areas to determine the topology-related building 
parameters separately for each individual building.  This change allows for specific 
building footprints and urban development patterns to be considered in the fire spread 
simulation rather than an idealized building grid (Figure 3.2). 
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Fig. 3.2.  Comparison of building grid of uniform size and spacing required by HAZUS-MH urban fire 
spread calculations (left) and nonuniform size, shape, and spacing permitted by MUFS (right). 
 
3.2.3. Fire Suppression 
The HAZUS-MH fire suppression model assumes that the fire burns uncontrolled 
for some initial period, representing the delay in fire response while the fire is 
discovered by building occupants or passersby, the fire is reported to the fire department, 
and the firefighters travel to the fire’s location (FEMA 2003a).  Each component of this 
initial delay is modeled empirically from historical urban fire events.   
This approach is preserved in MUFS’s timeline of urban fire development.  The 
firefighters arrive at some time after the fire’s ignition; the length of this delay can be 
specified by the user or modeled empirically as described above. 
Once the firefighters arrive at the fire scene, their ability to control the fire’s 
spread is dependent on the number of fire engines and the flowrate of water available 
from hydrants adjacent to the fire’s location, as stated in Section 3.1.  The available 
water and fire trucks are measured against the needed water and fire trucks in both 
HAZUS-MH and MUFS, but the models differ in how they determine the needed 
resources.  The HAZUS-MH fire suppression model uses empirical relations to specify 
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the number of engines and amount of water needed to fight the fire based on the number 
of structures which have already been burned (FEMA 2003a).  MUFS uses HAZUS-
MH’s approach to determine the number of needed fire trucks but calculates the amount 
of water needed based on building-specific parameters such as structure size, 
construction materials and fireproofing techniques, and the structure’s contents.  The 
equation MUFS uses to calculate the needed water and the method used for determining 
the time period over which this water must be applied (and thereby the needed rate of 
flow of water from the hydrants) are described in Section 3.5.3.2. 
 Perhaps the most significant difference between the models occurs in the 
precision of the reported results.  Although HAZUS-MH can incorporate detailed 
information about urban layout and the water system, the results of its simulations are 
aggregated at the level of individual census tracts.  Thus, investigating an urban fire’s 
effect on a single building is not possible using HAZUS-MH.  In contrast, MUFS does 
report fire consequences in terms of individual buildings, so a more detailed analysis of 
buildings affected by the fire is possible using MUFS simulation output.   
The remainder of this section is devoted to presenting a detailed explanation of 
MUFS’s simulation processes. 
 
3.3. MUFS Data Requirements  
Because the Model of Urban Fire Spread’s calculations are highly tailored to the 
individual community being examined, the model is heavily dependent on user inputs of 
information about the system.  Before beginning a detailed discussion of how the model 
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works, it is useful to present an overview of the inputs needed for the simulations and the 
format these inputs should adopt. 
 
3.3.1. Urban Area Topology: Building Map and Building Properties 
The most important input to the Model of Urban Fire Spread is detailed, building-
specific information about the urban topology, including the coordinates of the vertices 
of each building.  Other information necessary for the fire spread and suppression 
calculations includes  the building’s area and height, its usual number of occupants, and  
information about the building’s fireproof construction and the fire hazard posed by its 
contents   The building’s Occupancy Hazard Classification (OHC) is an integer measure 
of the fire danger posed by the building’s contents.  OHC values are discussed in greater 
detail in Section 3.5.  The building’s Exposure Factor (EF) indicates whether the 
building is close enough to its nearest neighbors to pose an exposure hazard to 
surrounding buildings if it catches fire.  This property has a value of 1 if the building is 
smaller than 100 ft2 in footprint or more than 50 feet away from its nearest neighbors 
and would not pose an exposure risk to the surrounding area if it caught fire.  Otherwise, 
the value of this parameter is 1.5 (Eckman 1994).  The building’s Construction 
Classification Number (CCN) represents the level of fireproof construction techniques 
employed in constructing the building.  A value of 1.0 indicates general construction 
practices; lower values indicate fire-resistive or fireproof construction (Eckman 1994).  
Occupancy Hazard Classification, Exposure Factor, and Construction Classification 
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Number are used to calculate the amount of water required to extinguish a burning 
building; these values are used in the calculations described in Section 3.5.3.2. 
Values for these parameters for some of the buildings in Micropolis are shown in 
Table 3.1 below.  In the computer code developed for this study, the building 
information was stored in two ASCII files – one for building topology information and 
one for building properties – with information about buildings linked by unique building 
ID values. 
 
3.3.2. Water Distribution System Information 
 In order to calculate the amount of water available for firefighting, MUFS must 
have detailed information about the layout and connectivity of the community’s water 
distribution system.  The study reported here used data from the hydraulic network 
modeling system EPANet (Rossman 2002).   
 The hydraulic model should include fire hydrant nodes, which MUFS uses to 
apply fire demands during the simulation of fire suppression.  The fire hydrants should 
be installed with check valves which permit flow out of the hydrants but not into the 
system.  This requirement is designed to prevent modeling inaccuracies in the fire 
suppression simulation and is related to how MUFS calculates the amount of firefighting 
water available.  During the fire suppression simulation, if MUFS is unable to obtain the 
needed fireflow at firefighting pressure by simply imposing a fireflow demand, it 
changes the fire hydrant node from an ordinary junction node to an “emitter” node to 
determine how much water is available at firefighting pressure.  If negative pressures 
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exist at the hydrant node (which can be caused by heavy damage or excessive demands 
on the water distribution system), an emitter will permit the simulated flow of water into 
the water distribution system, although no source of input water exists at the emitter 
node.  Installing check valves immediately upstream of the fire hydrants prevents this 
inaccuracy from occurring. 
 MUFS uses the hydrants’ coordinates to locate the closest hydrant to a burning 
building and accesses the water distribution system model at a precise location once it 
has located the correct hydrant for firefighting.  This process is discussed in further 
detail in Section 3.5.2. 
 
3.3.3. Fire Truck Availability Schedule 
The final required input to the MUFS simulation is a schedule of when fire truck 
resources become available to the community.  A community’s own fire trucks are 
immediately available for deployment to a fire, even though there is some delay in fire 
response associated with travel time to the fire’s location.  Thus, the resources located in 
the community should be listed in the schedule as being available at the start of the 
simulation; actual firefighting does not begin until the delay in fire response specified by 
the modeler. 
Many fire departments have mutual-aid agreements with the fire departments of 
surrounding communities.  If the community’s firefighting resources are overwhelmed, 
it may call on its mutual aid partners, who will deploy additional fire trucks.  These fire 
trucks will arrive some time after the fire begins, because of the delay involved in the 
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target community’s calling for mutual aid and the travel time between the donor and 
target communities.  The delay before these additional firefighting resources become 
available is captured in the fire truck availability schedule.  The fire truck availability 
schedule for “Micropolis,” the model community used in this study, is shown 
graphically in Figure 3.3.   
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Fig. 3.3. Fire truck availability schedule for Micropolis. 
 
3.4. Unsuppressed Fire Spread 
Like the original Hamada model of urban fire spread, MUFS calculates the fire’s 
propagation in four directions relative to the wind vector: downwind, the direction wind 
is blowing; upwind, the direction of the wind’s origin; sidewind-left, the direction which 
is 90 degrees counter-clockwise from downwind or immediately to the left of a person 
facing in the downwind direction; and sidewind-right, which is offset 90 degrees 
clockwise from downwind.   
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The fire’s progress in each of the four directions depends in part on the 
buildings’ thickness along the fire spread direction (represented as a) and their 
separation from each other (d).  The original Hamada equations assumed square 
buildings of uniform size and spacing, so a single set of values for the buildings’ a and d 
parameters could be applied to the entire urban area.  As shown previously in Figure 3.2, 
MUFS permits an added degree of realism by allowing buildings to vary in size, shape, 
and layout; thus, it is necessary to calculate each building’s  a and d values separately.   
 
3.4.1. Calculating Building-Specific Urban Layout Properties 
 The first step in calculating unsuppressed fire spread is to find the buildings 
which lie along each of the four fire spread vectors and determine their a and d values.  
MUFS does this by searching for intersections between the fire spread vectors and every 
face of each building.  With the exception of the ignition buildings – the buildings in 
which the ignition points lie – every building which lies on a fire spread vector has at 
least one entry and exit point.  (The program distinguishes between entry and exit points 
based on their distance from the fire’s ignition point.)  For each building, the distance 
between the entry point and the exit point is the building’s thickness along the fire 
spread vector, or its a value.  Similarly, the distance from the building’s exit point to the 
next building’s entry point is the two buildings’ separation along the fire vector, and this 
d value is assigned to the building the fire has just left.  (Therefore, the last building the 
fire spread vector intersects before it leaves the urban area has no d value assigned, 
because the vector never enters another building.)   
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Because the fires start inside the ignition buildings, these buildings have an exit 
point in each fire spread direction but no entry point.  The ignition building’s a value, 
which can be different in each direction, is the distance between the ignition point and 
the fire vector’s exit point.  The ignition buildings’ d values are calculated in the same 
manner as other buildings which intersect the fire spread vector.  The d values for the 
ignition buildings may also be different in each fire spread direction. 
 
3.4.2. Calculating Fire Spread Distance 
 Once it has calculated the a and d values for the buildings along the fire spread 
fronts, MUFS has all the information it needs to calculate the unsuppressed fire spread 
distance for each time step.  Although fire suppression does begin at some user-specified 
time, the model calculates unsuppressed fire spread distance for each time step in the 
simulation.  This is because the fire suppression calculations require a time period for 
each burning building over which the water for fire suppression must be applied.  The 
unsuppressed burn duration of the building is the logical maximum period over which 
the firefighting water must be applied, because if the water is not applied over this time 
period the fire front will spread to the adjacent buildings.  The water application time is 
calculated as the elapsed time between the fire front’s entry into the building and its exit 
from the building.  Therefore, it is necessary to run the unsuppressed fire spread 
calculations for the entire length of the simulation even though the unsuppressed burning 
period may be only a small fraction of the total simulation length. 
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 The unsuppressed fire spread calculations proceed as follows.  In each direction 
and for each time step, the model calculates each ignition point’s incremental fire spread 
according to equations 3.1-3.3, which were preserved from the HAZUS Fire Following 
Earthquake model (FEMA 2003a) and adapted from the original Hamada model: 
 
t
T
daK
d
d −+= )(      (3.1) 
 
 
)()(
2 uu
u TtT
dadaK −++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +=    (3.2) 
 
 
)()(
2 ss
s TtT
dadaK −++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +=    (3.3) 
 
where Kd, Ku, and Ks are the incremental fire spread distances in meters calculated in the 
downwind, upwind, and sidewind directions, respectively.  The variable a represents the 
thickness (measured in meters) of the building which the fire currently occupies 
projected along the direction of fire spread and d is the currently-burning building’s 
separation in meters from the next building along the fire spread vector.  The length of 
the simulation time step is represented by the variable t.  The variables Td, Tu, and Ts 
represent the amount of time the fire takes to spread, in each direction, throughout the 
length of one building plus the space separating it from the next building.  In other 
words, Td is how long the fire takes to spread the distance (a + d) in the downwind 
direction, and Tu and Ts are similar measures of fire propagation time in the upwind and 
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sidewind directions.  These propagation times are calculated by MUFS, following the 
techniques used by HAZUS-MH (FEMA 2003a), using equations 3.4-3.6 below: 
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where V is the wind velocity in meters per second and fb is a numerical representation of 
the percent of the building which employs fireproof construction techniques. This 
variable is dimensionless and ranges in value from 0 to 1.     
 It is noted that equations 3.1-3.3 and 3.4-3.6 have different forms for each 
direction.  This is due to the wind’s effect on the rate of fire spread, which is different 
for each direction.  Fire spread in the downwind direction is driven by the wind, so 
higher wind speeds contribute to a greater rate of fire spread.  Conversely, fire spread in 
the upwind direction goes against the wind in order to make progress, so higher wind 
speeds contribute to lower rates of fire spread.  Sidewind-direction fire spread is 
intermediate in speed, so the sidewind-left and sidewind-right directions use a third fire 
spread equation.   
 In this model it is assumed that the community has a single prevailing wind 
direction and a constant wind speed.  In reality, both wind speed and direction may vary 
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spatially and temporally.  This ability is not currently incorporated into MUFS because 
of practical limitations on computational complexity; however, enabling the simulation 
of fire spread under changing wind speed and direction is a topic for future research. 
 Each of the six equations listed above uses a, d, and fb values for the building in 
which the fire resides at the beginning of the time step.  If the fire front moves into a 
new building or buildings during the time step, then MUFS recalculates fire spread using 
values of the building-specific parameters averaged over the relevant buildings in the 
time step. 
 After MUFS has calculated the fire spread for each ignition point and each time 
step, it determines the time at which the burn front enters and exits each building in 
order to calculate the buildings’ burn durations (represented as Tburn in later equations).. 
When an urban fire simulation includes multiple ignition points and more than one 
ignition point’s fire front intersects a building, the burn front which reaches the building 
first is used to calculate its burn duration.  This is reasonable because an area cannot 
burn twice; therefore, the fire front which reaches an area first will be the front which 
actually ignites the area. 
 
3.5. Suppressed Fire Spread 
Once the program has run the unsuppressed fire spread calculations and 
determined the buildings’ burn durations, MUFS is ready to begin simulating fire spread 
under suppression efforts.  Once the firefighters arrive at the scene of the fire, there are 
two possible outcomes of the fire suppression effort,  If the firefighters have enough fire 
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trucks and water at adequate pressure and flowrate to extinguish the fire, then the 
firefighters achieve totally effective fire suppression and the fire’s progress halts in that 
direction.  Because MUFS simulates fire suppression under disaster conditions, however, 
the fire department and water distribution system may not be able to provide sufficient 
resources for totally-effective fire suppression.  In this case, MUFS calculates a reduced 
rate of fire spread based on the ratio of available resources to needed resources. 
The main task of the suppressed fire spread module is to allocate fire trucks and 
water for firefighting at each time step.  This process begins with the deployment of fire 
trucks to the burning buildings. 
 
3.5.1. Fire Truck Assignment 
 The number of fire trucks available is a user input to MUFS, and this value can 
change over time to reflect the arrival of additional fire trucks after a short delay, in 
fulfillment of mutual aid contracts between the target community and other nearby 
jurisdictions.  MUFS checks at each time step to see if any new fire trucks have arrived. 
 At each time step, the buildings currently burning are sorted in order of 
firefighting priority.  MUFS currently allows the user to choose whether to prioritize 
firefighting by the building’s number of occupants or the flammability of its contents, 
which is represented by the building’s Occupancy Hazard Classification (“OHC”; 
Eckman 1994).  OHC numerical values are inversely related to firefighting priority.  
Buildings with highly flammable contents (e.g., flour mills, lumber yards, textile 
factories, etc.) are high priority assignments for fire truck assignment and have low OHC 
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values; buildings with lower quantities of flammable contents (e.g., apartments, schools, 
hotels, etc.) are lower priority assignments and have high OHC values.  Typical values 
of OHC, determined by the building’s use and typical contents, are presented in Table 
3.1.  As discussed below, the OHC also is used to calculate the volume of water required 
to extinguish fire in a building. 
 
Table 3.1. Typical Occupancy Hazard Classification Values (Adapted from Eckman 1994) 
OHC Description Example Buildings 
3 Severe Hazard 
Occupancies 
Explosives storage, lumberyards, baled straw or hay storage, 
plastics manufacturing 
4 High Hazard 
Occupancies 
Building materials storage, Department stores, Auto repair 
garages, Warehouses 
5 Moderate Hazard 
Occupancies 
Libraries, Restaurants, Abandoned Buildings 
6 Low Hazard 
Occupancies 
Churches, Gas Stations, Funeral Homes 
7 Light Hazard 
Occupancies 
Residential Dwellings, Hotels, Schools 
 
 
 
 Starting with the highest-priority burning building, MUFS assigns one fire truck 
per building until all trucks are assigned.  Once a fire truck arrives at its target building, 
it locates the nearest serviceable fire hydrant.  This is the fire hydrant closest to the 
building vertex nearest to the burn front.  However, to protect the safety of the 
firefighters, the target fire hydrant must not lie inside the polygon which defines the 
burning area.  In addition, the fire hydrant must be located within 1000 feet of the 
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building vertex nearest to the burn front: a practical limitation imposed by the excessive 
friction loss caused by laying long suction lines from the hydrant to the fire truck 
(Eckman 1994). 
 
3.5.2. Water Distribution System Interface 
 When each fire truck has been assigned a target building and fire hydrant, MUFS 
accesses the water system to determine the available fire flow.  To do this, MUFS uses 
the EPANet hydraulic model (Rossman 2002) to impose a firefighting demand of 1000 
gallons per minute (gpm) for each target fire hydrant, which is a typical flow rating for a 
fire engine’s onboard pump (Mahoney 1980).  If more than one fire truck is assigned to a 
hydrant, multiple fire demands may be imposed.  Using the EPANet software, MUFS 
then checks the pressure at each of the target hydrant nodes.  Water for firefighting must 
be delivered at the hydrant at a minimum pressure of 20 pounds per square inch (psi) 
(NFPA 2006).  If the pressure at the target hydrant is greater than or equal to 20 psi, the 
hydrant is able to supply the needs of the fire truck(s) connected to it and the truck or 
trucks receive the full 1000 gpm. 
 If the water distribution system is unable to supply the needed firefighting 
demand at the minimum pressure, due to excessive demands on or damage to the system, 
MUFS determines how much water the system can provide at the minimum firefighting 
pressure.  To do this, the model removes the fire flow demands from the insufficient-
pressure hydrant nodes and converts them to emitter nodes, which behave in the 
hydraulic model like uncontrolled orifices through which water flows at a rate 
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determined by the opening size and water pressure.  (Hydrants which can provide fire 
flows at adequate pressures are not converted to emitters, but their fire flow demands are 
left in place for the length of the time step.)  The elevation of each emitter node is 
increased by 46 feet, which is the elevation head equivalent of a pressure of 20 psi.  This 
step guarantees that any flow the emitter can provide will exit the emitter at a pressure of 
20 psi.  The node’s emitter coefficient is set to 1850 gpm/psi1/2, which is appropriate for 
a fire hydrant with a ten-inch orifice (derivation of this value is shown in Appendix 1).  
The program then re-runs the hydraulic analysis; the flow from the emitters, if any, 
represents the flow that the hydrants can provide at a pressure of 20 psi.  This flow is 
supplied to the fire trucks, and if more than one truck is connected to a hydrant the 
available flow is divided evenly among the connected trucks. 
It was determined during model testing that the EPANet model of the water 
distribution system should include check valves in the pipes connecting the hydrants to 
the water system, because if the hydrant nodes experience negative (suction) pressures 
during firefighting operations, the emitters will simulate water flow into the water 
distribution system.  This is not consistent with actual physical circumstances, and 
installing check valves at the hydrants permits water to flow out for firefighting but 
prevents flow into the system due to negative pressures. 
 
3.5.3. Factors in Fire Suppression Effectiveness 
 Once MUFS has assigned the fire trucks and tapped the water distribution system 
to determine the available fire flow, the model has half of the information it needs to 
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calculate suppression effectiveness: the number of fire trucks and amount of water which 
are actually available.  These values must be compared, however, to the number of 
trucks and amount of water which are needed to suppress the fire. 
 
3.5.3.1. Trucks Needed 
 HAZUS-MH prescribes an empirical formula for determining how many fire 
trucks are needed based on the total number of burned buildings (FEMA 2003a).  MUFS 
calculates the number of buildings burned at the beginning of each time step at the same 
time the currently-burning buildings are determined.  Both operations are based on the 
previous time step’s burn polygon.  Currently-burning buildings are those with some 
(but not all) vertices inside the burn polygon; the tally of burned buildings includes 
buildings with any number of vertices inside the burned area.  This total count of burned 
buildings is the basis for determining the number of fire trucks needed based on the 
relationship adopted from HAZUS-MH, shown in Figure 3.4. 
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Fig. 3.4.  Number of fire trucks needed to extinguish an urban fire based on how many buildings are 
burned.  Adapted from FEMA (2003a).   
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For multi-ignition fires, MUFS calculates the number of trucks needed separately for 
each ignition point, and the number of fire trucks assigned to each ignition is tabulated 
separately as well. 
 
3.5.3.2. Water Needed 
 The amount of water needed to extinguish a burning building is calculated 
separately for each building.  The total volume of water needed is recommended by the 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA 1993 cited in Eckman 1994) as: 
 
EFCCN
OHC
VolTWS ⋅⋅=     (3.7) 
 
This formula uses common and readily-available information to calculate the volume of 
water needed.  In the equation above, TWS is the total water supply in gallons needed to 
suppress the fire.  Vol refers to the volume of the structure in cubic feet.  OHC, the 
structure’s Occupancy Hazard Classification, is a dimensionless indicator of a building’s 
hazardous or inflammable contents.  OHC values are integers ranging from 3 (for high-
hazard buildings like explosives storage facilities) to 7 (for low-hazard buildings like 
homes, fire departments, and schools).  CCN, the structure’s Construction Classification 
Number, is a dimensionless indicator of the burning structure’s fireproofing: a minimum 
CCN of 0.5 indicates a fire-resistant structure made of fireproof materials and designed 
to withstand fire, whereas a maximum CCN of 1.5 indicates a wood frame building.   
The final parameter in the above equation EF is the building’s Exposure Factor, is a 
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multiplier to incorporate the extra water supply needed when a burning structure is 
located close to other structures and poses an exposure risk to its unburned neighbors.  
This parameter is 1.0 when buildings present no particular exposure risk; its value is 1.5 
when other buildings are located less than 50 feet from the burning structure. 
 It is important to note that the water needed for firefighting is specified as a 
volume of water, whereas the water available for fire fighting is calculated as a 
volumetric flow rate.  In order to compare the two values, it is necessary to express them 
on the same basis; one way to do this is to convert the volume of water needed for fire 
suppression into the required flow rate by dividing the volume by an appropriate 
application time.   
 As explained above in Section 3.4, this needed application time is the motivation 
for calculating the unsuppressed burn duration of each building which could possibly be 
touched by the fire.  The reason for using this time is that it represents a logical 
maximum period over which the firefighting water can be applied – because if the fire is 
not suppressed within this time period, the fire front will move on and consume adjacent 
buildings.  Thus, the minimum flow rate required for effective fire suppression is given 
by dividing the needed water volume (equation 3.7) by its maximum possible application 
time length (equation 3.8): 
burn
needed
T
TWSQ =       (3.8) 
 
where Qneeded is the volumetric flow rate in gallons per minute (gpm) needed to 
extinguish the building; TWS is the amount of water (in gallons) needed to suppress the 
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fire, as calculated in Equation 3.7; and Tburn is the unsuppressed burn duration (in 
minutes) calculated for the building. 
 
3.5.4. Fire Suppression Effectiveness: Adjusting Fire Propagation Rate for 
Available Fire Suppression Resources 
When MUFS has determined the needed and available firefighting resources, the 
next step is to adjust the normal (unsuppressed) rate of fire spread to account for 
partially- or totally-effective fire suppression.  Following the fire suppression algorithm 
contained in the Fire Following Earthquake module of HAZUS-MH (FEMA 2003a), 
MUFS calculates the ratio of available water and fire trucks to the needed resources: 
 
neededTrucks
availableTrucks
truck
N
NR
,
,=                    (3.9) 
needed
availablewater
Q
QR =       (3.10) 
 
where Ntrucks,needed is the number of fire trucks predicted to be needed to suppress the 
ignition point’s fire based on the number of burning buildings; Ntrucks,available is the 
number of fire trucks actually assigned to the ignition point; Qneeded is the volumetric 
flow rate (in gpm) prescribed to extinguish the fire at a specific building; and Qavailable is 
the volumetric flow rate (in gpm) actually available for firefighting from the water 
distribution system.    
  
42
Next, the program calculates the incremental unsuppressed fire spread distance in 
each fire spread direction for each ignition point.  It is necessary to re-run these 
calculations for the current time step, even though they were run previously for the entire 
simulation length, because the unsuppressed fire spread calculations rely on building-
specific characteristics and the time step’s building data may have changed due to fire 
suppression in an earlier time step.  The incremental unsuppressed fire spread distance is 
calculated as described in Section 3.4, using equations 3.1 – 3.6.   
 The unsuppressed fire spread distance is a baseline fire spread distance for the 
time step: a maximum distance which can be reduced based on the success of the 
firefighting efforts.  The reduction factor, adopted from the HAZUS-MH fire 
suppression algorithm (FEMA 2003a), is calculated using Equation 3.11 below, which 
requires the truck and water ratios calculated using Equations 3.9 and 3.10: 
 { }0.7max ( ) , 0.33effective truck water truckP R R R= ⋅ ⋅    (3.11) 
 
In Equation 3.10, Peffective is a unitless reduction factor ranging in value from 0 to 1.  It 
has a minimum value of one-third the value of Rtruck calculated in equation 3.9.   
 Using methodology derived from HAZUS-MH (FEMA 2003a), this reduction 
factor is used to adjust the incremental fire spread distance according to Equation 3.12: 
 
0.7
,sup , sup (1 )d pressed d non pressed effectiveK K P−= ⋅ −    (3.12) 
 
In this equation, Kd,suppressed is the incremental fire spread distance under fire suppression 
and Kd,non-suppressed is the incremental distance the fire would spread if it were totally 
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unsuppressed.  Kd,non-suppressed is calculated as described in Section 3.4.2 using Equation 
3.1, 3.2, or 3.3 (depending on the fire spread direction). 
If the fire department has all the resources it needs for totally effective fire 
suppression – i.e., Rtruck and Rwater are both equal to 1 – then the reduction factor 
calculated in Equation 3.10 above is also equal to 1 and the suppressed incremental fire 
spread distance is zero.  In this case, the fire’s progress in that direction halts and does 
not re-start at a later time step.  Since the reduction factor is calculated separately in each 
fire spread direction, the fire may halt in some of an ignition point’s fire spread 
directions and continue to progress in other directions. 
 If either Rtruck or Rwater is less than 1, the fire undergoes partially effective 
suppression.  This means that the fire’s progress slows and the time step’s incremental 
suppressed fire spread distance is less than its unsuppressed value, but the fire’s progress 
does not halt.  The reduced fire spread distance is calculated using Equation 3.11 above. 
 It is important to note that Rtruck and Rwater are calculated separately for each 
ignition point and for each time step, and the values may change over time and between 
ignition points.  Rtruck may be different for each ignition point in a multi-ignition fire 
even within the same time step, and this is likely in cases where one ignition point is 
located in an area which receives high priority for fire suppression (due to a 
concentration of buildings with high population or low OHC) and another ignition point 
is located in an area with lower fire suppression priority.  If there are not enough fire 
trucks to meet the needs of every burning building, then the high-priority ignition point 
will receive more fire trucks and will consequently have a higher Rtruck value than the 
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low-priority ignition point.  All fire spread directions within the same ignition point have 
the same Rtruck value; this is because the number of fire trucks needed is determined for 
the entire ignition point and cannot be resolved to the level of individual buildings or fire 
spread directions.  The heuristic rule used to determine how many fire trucks are needed 
at an ignition point was adopted from HAZUS-MH, which does not determine fire 
suppression effectiveness at the level of individual buildings.  Using fire suppression 
effectiveness metrics which were designed for different scales of spatial resolution may 
introduce some uncertainty into the fire suppression calculations.  Development of 
building-scale recommendations for fire truck assignment would improve the accuracy 
of the calculations, and integrating more precise fire truck assignment recommendations 
is a goal of future model development.   
The methodology used to calculate the amount of water needed for fire 
suppression was adopted from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA 2006) 
and is applicable at the level of individual buildings.  Therefore, the value of Rwater may 
vary between fire spread directions associated with the same ignition point.  Buildings 
are assigned to the nearest fire spread direction for the purpose of calculating Rwater.  For 
each burning building, the nearest fire spread direction is the one whose front point is 
nearest to the building vertex which is closest to the fire front. 
 The process of assigning fire trucks, imposing firefighting demands, determining 
Rtruck and Rwater, and calculating the fire suppression effectiveness is repeated for each 
time step from the beginning of fire response until the end of the simulation.   
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3.6. MUFS Simulation Results 
3.6.1. Burn Front Coordinates 
MUFS converts the fire spread vectors calculated using the Hamada fire spread 
equations to X-Y coordinates using a straightforward application of vector mathematics.  
For each fire spread vector, MUFS uses the vector’s total length at each time step and 
the vector’s angle to decompose the vector into its X and Y components.  These 
components, when added to the X-Y coordinates of the ignition point, yield the X-Y 
coordinates of the fire front points.   
 
3.6.2. List of Burning Buildings 
Once the coordinates of the fire front boundary points are known, MUFS 
determines which buildings are totally burned or in the process of burning at the end of 
the simulation.  The list of burned and partially-burned buildings is an important output 
because the consequences of the multi-mode attack and failure simulations conducted 
with MUFS are recorded as the number of people who are displaced – that is, people 
who lose their home and/or place of employment – because of the fire.  To calculate this 
value, MUFS must know which buildings are partially or totally destroyed. 
MUFS locates the burning buildings by checking each building in the urban area 
to see whether some or all of its vertices are inside the burn polygon.  Currently, the list 
of burned buildings does not distinguish between partially-burned buildings (some, but 
not all, vertices inside the burned area) and totally-burned buildings (all vertices inside 
the burned area), but this distinction is possible if it is desired in the future. 
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If any of a building’s vertices are inside the burned area, the building is counted 
as a burned building in the determination of the urban fire’s final consequences. 
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 4.  METHODOLOGY: ANALYZING VULNERABILITY TO  
MULTI-MODE ATTACKS AND FAILURES 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Understanding the potential consequences of a multi-mode attack or failure 
(MMAF), an attack or disaster which simultaneously disables one or more support 
infrastructures for fire response and ignites an urban fire, is the first step in designing 
mitigation strategies to prepare for and lessen the impact of this type of event.   
Several different methods are presented as alternatives for exploring the potential 
consequences of an MMAF in an example community.  The relative advantages of each 
technique are discussed as well, and the results and interpretation of each technique will 
be presented in Section 5.  The process of designing and testing mitigation strategies 
based on these results will be presented in Section 6.   
 
4.2. Overview of Vulnerability Analysis 
The main goal of the multi-mode attack or failure vulnerability assessment is to 
provide a detailed understanding of the progress and expected consequences of a disaster 
involving an urban fire with disabled water system and/or other support infrastructures.  
Simulating this type of event across a wide variety of attack and disaster scenarios yields 
insight into the most frequent and worst-case consequence profiles.     
It is useful to examine each mode of a multi-mode attack or failure separately 
before discussing the consequences of the modes’ joint action.  Sections 4.3.1 through 
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4.3.6 will present the procedure for modeling damage to a community water distribution 
system.  Sections 4.3.7 through 4.3.9 will discuss the methodology for modeling damage 
to the communications or transportation infrastructures, which can impede fire response. 
Section 4.4 contains a scenario-based method used to determine ignition points 
for the urban fire aspect of the multi-mode attack or failure.  The overall procedure for 
modeling MMAF scenarios – a synthesis of the support infrastructure damage scenarios 
covered in Section 4.3 and the urban fire scenarios covered in Section 4.4-- is discussed 
in Section 4.5 
Conducting scenario-based simulations of multi-mode attacks or failures is only 
one potential method for determining the possible range of consequences of this type of 
disaster.  A complementary method for determining the worst-case fire ignition points 
based on optimization is presented in Section 4.6. 
Once each mode of the multi-mode attack or failure is specified, the facets of the 
disaster are combined and simulated together using the Model of Urban Fire Spread 
(MUFS), which was described in Section 3.  The results of the multi-mode attack and 
failure simulations will be presented and discussed in Section 5. 
 
4.3. Damage Scenarios: Water System 
 Water distribution networks are complex systems, and the types of vulnerabilities they 
may face are numerous.  In order to model attacks on water systems and recommend 
protective strategies, it is necessary to identify the most likely modes of attack on the 
water system.  Indeed, water utilities across the United States have already completed 
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this process as the first step in hardening the nation’s water infrastructure., as required 
by the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (PL 107-88).  
 The first step in this project’s vulnerability analysis for multi-mode attacks and 
failure scenarios is to select a small set of attack/failure scenarios centered on the 
community’s water distribution to disable its fire response The selection process focuses 
both on the physical ease of access required to the system and on the probable magnitude 
of the resulting damage.   
Without a specific water system for consideration, however, it is impossible to 
provide more than a general listing of potential vulnerability types.  Due to heightened 
security concerns after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it is difficult to obtain a sufficiently 
detailed electronic model of a real community water system and publish the results of an 
in-depth vulnerability analysis.  Therefore, a detailed “mock city” water system model 
was used to conduct the vulnerability analysis and explore the effect of a multi-mode 
attack/failure on a realistic city without presenting a security risk to a real community.  
The Micropolis model (Brumbelow et al. 2006), developed at Texas A&M University, is 
a detailed and realistic model of a fictional small town (pop. 5,000) implemented in 
geographic information system (ArcGIS 9) and hydraulic modeling (EPANet) software.   
Micropolis obtains its water from two sources, a surface-water reservoir and a 
small community wellfield.  Water from these sources is combined and treated at a 
single water treatment plant.  After the water treatment plant, three identical high-service 
pumps operating in parallel convey the water to the distribution network. 
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Pipe diameters for water mains range from two inches (original cast iron mains 
located primarily in the central business district) to twelve inches (modern ductile-iron 
mains located primarily in the outlying regions of the city).  Under peak normal or fire 
demands the system experiences considerable head loss in regions with low-diameter 
mains.  The city has a single elevated storage tank, located in the central business 
district, with a maximum storage volume of approximately 50,000 cubic feet.     
 
4.3.1. Damage Profile A: Long-Term Damage to High-Service Pumps 
A series of attack and damage scenarios affecting the Micropolis water 
distribution system were modeled in the hydraulic modeling software, EPANet.  The 
first category of attacks/failures involves the long-term incapacitation of one or more of 
the high-service pumps which supply water to the city.  This situation could arise from a 
variety of causes: sabotage against the water system, long-term power failure, or an 
accident or natural disaster which destroys or does serious damage to the pumps and 
cannot be repaired within a few hours.  The affected pumps were shut down for the 
duration of the simulation; this condition is modeled in EPANet by setting the status of 
the affected pump(s) to “Closed,” which can be done easily through the EPANet user 
interface.  Damage profile A01 featured all three high-service pumps permanently out of 
service.  Damage profile A02 damaged two of the three high-service pumps but left one 
still operational.  Damage profile A03 reflected damage to one pump, with the other two 
pumps still operating.  Because the pumps are identical and are operating in parallel, the 
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number of pumps in service is important but the identity of the specific individual 
pump(s) sustaining damage has no bearing on the scenario’s consequences. 
 
4.3.2. Damage Profile B: Short-Term Power Outage to Pumps 
Like Scenario A, Scenario B examines the consequences of pump incapacitation 
during a multi-mode attack or failure.  The damage profiles modeled in this category, 
however, involve short-term damage to the system’s pumps, and the pumps are restored 
to operation after a period of incapacitation.  This scenario was intended to model the 
effects of power outages, in which the pumps stop operating when they are not supplied 
with electric power (if the water system has no backup generator) but come back online 
when power is restored. 
This condition was modeled in EPANet by operating the system pumps on 
simple time-based operation patterns.  EPANet permits the user to enter operation levels 
for each hour of the day.  The patterns used to model the conditions represented in this 
category had a value of “0” (totally inoperable) during the pumps’ down time and a 
value of “1” (fully operational) at all other times.  This pattern was applied to all pumps 
in the system, because the high-service pumps are located close to the smaller pumps 
which supply water from the reservoir and wellfield to the water treatment plant.  
Because of the pumps’ close spatial grouping, it was assumed that they all operated from 
the same power feed. 
 Damage scenario B01 features a loss of power for two hours at the beginning of 
the simulation.  After two hours, power is restored and all pumps operate normally 
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thereafter.  Damage scenario B02 imposes a four-hour power loss at the beginning of the 
simulation.  In damage scenario B03, the pumps operate normally at the beginning of the 
simulation, but they lose power after two hours for a duration of two hours, and then 
regain power for the remainder of the simulation. 
 The proposal for this dissertation called for a damage profile C, which involved 
the destruction of the pipe which runs from the high-service pumps to the distribution 
grid.  In the Micropolis water system, this pipe is the only conduit from the water 
treatment plant to the distribution grid, and it is located immediately downstream from 
the system’s three high-service pumps.  Because of the topology of the Micropolis water 
system, this damage scenario is identical in impact to Scenario A01 (destruction of all 
three high-service pumps).  Therefore, damage profile C was judged to be redundant and 
not modeled separately. 
 
4.3.3. Damage Profile D: Destruction of Elevated Storage Tank 
Damage profiles A and B examine the effects of compromising the city’s 
firefighting by restricting the flow of water into the system.  During times of peak 
demand or firefighting need, however, the city has another source of water at its 
disposal: water contained in the system’s elevated storage tank.  Many cities use their 
elevated storage tanks to provide surge capacity: the tanks drain during the high-demand 
portions of the day and refill at night.  Tanks also provide the extra water needed for 
extinguishing large fires.  Damage profile D examines the consequences of an attack or 
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disaster which destroys (or otherwise depletes) the city’s elevated storage tank and cuts 
off the community’s access to this surge capacity. 
Scenario D01 makes the tank unavailable from the start of the simulation.  This is 
modeled in EPANet by setting the status of the pipe which runs from the tank to the 
distribution grid to “Closed,” so no water can enter or leave the tank.  Scenario D02 cuts 
off access to the tank after one hour of simulation time.  In both these scenarios, the 
system’s pumps are left fully operational.  Modeling a compound damage profile which 
destroys both pumps and storage tank, thereby limiting or eliminating all the city’s 
sources of water for firefighting, is discussed in the next section. 
 
4.3.4. Damage Profile AD: Destruction of Pumps and Elevated Storage Tank 
 Two of the model scenarios studied in this project involve a coordinated attack or 
severe disaster which disables the water system’s pumps and the elevated storage tank.  
This compound damage profile combines elements from damage profile A and damage 
profile D.  In Scenario AD1, all three high-service pumps are disabled at the beginning 
of the simulation.  The tank is disabled after one hour of simulation time.  This scenario 
cuts off all sources of water for firefighting after the tank is destroyed, but it is assumed 
in MUFS that the fire department has some fire suppression capacity even if the water 
system cannot provide any water.  This partially-effective suppression accounts for 
firefighting tactics that do not rely on the water distribution system, such as drafting 
from alternative water sources or the use of fire-suppressing foam.  Eckman (1994) 
describes these measures in detail. 
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 Scenario AD2 disables only two of the three high-service pumps.  These cease 
functioning at the beginning of the simulation and remain inoperable for the entire 
duration.  The elevated storage tank is disabled after one hour of simulation time.  The 
third high-service pump, along with the booster pumps serving the surface reservoir and 
wellfield, remain in operation for the length of the simulation. 
  
4.3.5. Damage Profile E: Water Main Breaches 
Even with adequate supply of water, a water distribution system must be able to 
provide water at sufficient pressure for firefighting to provide totally effective fire 
suppression.  By causing sudden drops in pressure, a water main breach could impair a 
system’s ability to respond to firefighting demands.  The scenarios modeled in damage 
profile E examine this possibility. 
In theory any main may be breached, but this damage profile considers the 
sections of water main which are most vulnerable to damage.  In many communities, 
including Micropolis, water mains run under the streets.  In locations where the roads 
cross streams, the pipes are above ground and attached to the underside of bridges.  This 
comparative exposure may make the water mains more vulnerable to a deliberate attack 
or to a natural disaster like a flood or earthquake destroying the bridge and the attached 
pipes. 
Four different water main breach scenarios were modeled in this study.  
Micropolis has seven bridges.  Three of the damage scenarios involve single bridge 
failures; damage scenarios E01, E02, and E03 involve the destruction of the furthest 
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downstream, the most-used, and the furthest upstream bridge/pipe pair.  Damage 
scenario E04 involves the simultaneous destruction of the furthest downstream and 
highest-use bridge/pipe pairs.  In each case, the destruction of the bridges occurs at the 
start of the simulation.  The location of the water main breaches are shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Fig. 4.1. Location of water main breaches modeled for damage profile E.  The blue-shaded area is the 
furthest-downstream bridge and is modeled as damage scenario E01.  The green-shaded area is the 
heaviest-traveled bridge and is modeled as damage scenario E02.  The red area is the furthest-upstream 
bridge and is modeled as damage scenario E03.  A dual breach affecting the blue and green shaded areas 
was modeled as damage scenario E04. 
 
 
After the destruction of the bridge and the accompanying pipe breach, water 
flows freely from both sides of the breach for fifteen minutes of simulation time.  This 
delay represents the water utility’s efforts to control the water loss through the breach.  
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Flow through the open pipe ends is modeled in EPANet as an emitter at either end of the 
breached pipe.  In EPANet, an emitter is a hydraulic device which regulates outflow 
through an orifice based on the area of the orifice and pressure at the emitter’s location 
(Rossman 2002).  In simple terms, this represents flow through a hole which is open to 
the environment.  After fifteen minutes, the isolation valves on either side of the breach 
are closed using a simple time-based control embedded in the EPANet input file.  In the 
Micropolis water distribution system model, there are 197 manually-operated gate valves 
which can be used to restrict or redirect flow in the event of a water main breach or 
contamination event (Brumbelow et al. 2006).  Closing the isolation valves on either side 
of the breach cuts off the flow through the pipe breaches and restores pressurized flow to 
the system. 
 
4.3.6. Damage Profile F: Isolation of Water Contamination 
 The final damage profile involves the water utility voluntarily isolating sections 
of the water distribution system in order to contain an accidental or deliberate 
contamination.  Contamination of water distribution systems has long been a concern in 
the field of water systems security, and isolating the contamination as soon as possible 
after its discovery is often recommended as a security strategy (AWWA 2004; EPA 
2002; EPA 2004).  In some cases the isolated contaminated water cannot even be used 
for firefighting, since it may pose an inhalation or cutaneous contact hazard (Department 
of Homeland Security [DHS] and Texas Engineering Extension Service [TEEX] 2004).  
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The simulations of damage profile F investigate the effects that isolation of areas of the 
water distribution system may have on firefighting efforts. 
 Five different contaminant isolation scenarios were simulated.  For each 
scenario, the isolation valves at all points of inflow and outflow to the contaminated 
areas were closed at the beginning of the simulation.  In addition to cutting off flow to 
the hydrants in the affected areas, in many cases this forced the water for firefighting at 
non-contaminated locations to take alternate routes which involved higher energy loss, 
thereby decreasing the pressure of any water arriving at firefighting hydrants.  This 
decreased pressure sometimes resulted in decreased available flow at the minimum 
required pressure. 
 Scenario F01 involves the isolation of a large-diameter main on the southeast 
side of the water distribution system.  This pipe supplies water to the wastewater 
treatment plant and is a major conduit for water flow to the east side of town.  The area 
affected by the isolation is shaded in red on Figure 4.2 . 
In Scenario F02, the city’s central business district is isolated.  This scenario cuts 
off water flow to the center of the city, where many of the government and heavy-use 
buildings used as ignition points in urban fire spread simulations (described below in 
Section 4.4) are located.  The affected area is show in Figure 4.3. 
 Scenario F03 simulates the response to the contamination of the water in the 
elevated storage tank by isolating the tank and the pipes in its immediate vicinity.  This 
prevents firefighting efforts located elsewhere in the city from using the tank to supply 
firefighting water, forcing the other hydrants to rely instead upon the water which can be 
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supplied by the water treatment plant and high-service pumps.  The isolated area for 
Scenario F03 is shown in Figure 4.4. 
  Scenario F04 models isolation of a contamination of the water supply to city’s 
highest-density residential area.  Approximately half of the city’s residents live in or 
near the affected area; therefore, a reliable water supply to this area for drinking and 
firefighting is very important.  The affected area is shown in Figure 4.5. 
 The final scenario modeled in damage profile F involves the contamination and 
isolation of the northwest corner of town, which is a low-population-density, high-value 
residential area.  The affected area is indicated in Figure 4.6. 
 
Fig. 4.2. Zone of water distribution system affected by damage scenario F01.  Pipes in the water 
distribution system are color-coded by diameter: red pipes are 2 inches or less in diameter; yellow pipes 
are 4 inches; green pipes are 6 inches; cyan pipes are 8 inches; and dark blue pipes are 12 inches.  Thus, 
the isolated zone for this damage scenario restricts passage through a section of large-diameter main which 
normally transmits high volumes of water to the east side of town. 
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Fig. 4.3. Zone of water distribution system affected by damage scenario F02.  This scenario isolates the 
Central Business District of Micropolis from the rest of the water distribution system. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.4. Zone of water distribution system affected by damage scenario F03.  This scenario isolates the 
city’s elevated storage tank and the nearby water mains from the rest of the water distribution system. 
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Fig. 4.5. Zone of water distribution system affected by damage scenario F04.  This scenario isolates a 
high-population-density residential area from the rest of the water distribution system. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.6. Zone of water distribution system affected by damage scenario F05.  This scenario isolates a 
high-value, low-density residential area from the rest of the water distribution system. 
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4.3.7. Damage Profile G: Transportation System Disruption 
 This analysis of interdependent critical infrastructures affecting fire response is 
not confined to the water distribution system.  In damage profile G, the effect of damage 
to the city’s transportation grid is examined.  This is an important consideration because 
damage to the community’s street network could impede firefighters’ travel to the fire 
site.   
 Scenario G01, the only scenario modeled in damage profile G, operates on an 
undamaged water distribution system; however, the transportation network has sustained 
nonspecific damage which delays firefighters’ arrival at the fire ground.  The fire 
response delay for Scenario G01 is 30 minutes, a threefold increase from the 10-minute 
delay assumed in the other scenarios.  This delay is not dependent on the relative 
location of the fire station and the ignition point or the location of the damage to the road 
network.  Because of this, a more detailed analysis of the effect of transportation 
network damage on fire response effectiveness which takes route analysis and specific 
damage profiles into account would be an excellent topic for future research. 
 
4.3.8. Damage Profile H: Communications Network Disruption 
 Because citizens generally use the telephone network to report a fire to the fire 
department, an attack or disaster which disables the city’s communications network has 
the potential to delay fire response efforts, since residents must then report the fire by 
walking or driving to the nearest fire station instead of reporting it by telephone.  
HAZUS-MH permits the user to specify whether the communications network is 
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damaged and to model the delay in fire response randomly (FEMA 2003a); MUFS 
permits random communications delays based on HAZUS-MH’s model, or the user may 
specify a deterministic delay in response. 
 Scenario H01 models the effect of a communications disruption on fire response 
using an undamaged water distribution system model and a delay in fire response of 20 
minutes.  This is longer than the normal fire response delay of 10 minutes used in most 
of the other damage scenarios, but shorter than the transportation-related delay of 30 
minutes specified in Scenario G01.   
 
4.3.9. Damage Profile BH: Pump and Communications Failures Caused by Power 
Outage 
 If the power failure modeled in damage profile B is extensive enough, it 
potentially could affect more than just the water distribution system’s pumps.  If a power 
outage affected the communications system as well, the outage could have a compound 
effect on fire suppression – both by delaying fire response and by interfering with the 
water system’s ability to provide water for firefighting.   
 Scenario BH1 is simulated with the same water system model as B01, which 
involves a power outage which disables the water system’s pumps for two hours.  After 
two hours, the pumps are restored to operation.  In addition to the temporarily-disabled 
pumps, the delay in fire response is 20 minutes, which is consistent with the 
communication failure modeled in damage profile H.  Scenario BH2 uses the hydraulic 
model from Scenario B02, in which the pumps are disabled for four hours and then 
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return to operation.  Like scenario BH1, this scenario combines the temporary water 
system damage from scenario B02 with a delay in fire response of 20 minutes. 
 
4.4. Urban Fire Ignition Points 
The disasters modeled in this study involve multiple modes of infrastructure 
attacks/failures, so it is necessary to specify not only the type of damage inflicted on the 
water distribution system but the distribution of ignition points for the urban fire which 
accompanies the water system damage.  As was stated earlier in Section 3, the ability to 
specify the fire’s ignition point or points is one major difference between the Model of 
Urban Fire Spread (MUFS) and the Fire Following Earthquake module of HAZUS-MH.  
There are many possible strategies to determining the ignition points to consider in the 
vulnerability analysis.  Emergency planners may study data on historical terrorist attacks 
in order to develop a list of the most likely targets based on known trends in vandals’ and 
terrorists’ prior targets.  This approach has the benefit of relying on extensive historical 
data and expert guidance as to the most frequent modes of terrorist attack.  It is not 
possible, however, to predict the potentially infinite variations on the most likely group 
of attacks which may occur.  In addition, natural disasters may start fires in random 
patterns which do not conform to terrorist target profiles.  A valuable addition to 
scenario-based vulnerability assessments is to find the worst-case target arrangement 
without consideration for the specific cause of the fire.  Optimization can be a helpful 
tool in determining this worst-case ignition point profile. 
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This dissertation adopts both approaches to MMAF vulnerability analysis.   The 
current section addresses the process of choosing a variety of urban fire scenarios meant 
to simulate specific types of attacks or disasters.  Section 4.5 presents the methodology 
for using optimization methods to determine the worst-case ignition point profile.  
Creating the ignition point profiles for the urban fire simulations requires the 
modeler to consider the ideological and cultural value of the buildings in the community 
and to choose the most likely targets for attack.  Although it is impossible to predict 
every potential terrorist target or attack, terrorist groups’ motivations are well-studied 
and often conform to specific criteria (Seger 2003).  In particular, the National Strategy 
for Homeland Security enumerates some of the threats inherent in an open and free 
society: “Americans congregate at schools, sporting arenas, malls, concert halls, office 
buildings, high-rise residences, and places of worship, presenting targets with the 
potential for many casualties” (OHS 2001, pp. 7-8).  With these trends in mind, five 
damage profiles were selected for study in the scenario-based urban fire modeling.  The 
emphasis during this process was on the targets chosen, not necessarily on the actors 
committing the attacks.  Thus, the actors could be domestic (also called “homegrown”) 
groups or international terrorist groups, but the modeling approach adopted here is 
similar for both because their effect on the community’s infrastructure is the same.  The 
identity, ideology, and origin of the groups committing the attacks are important to this 
analysis only because they may affect the group’s choice of targets.  The targets in these 
profiles were chosen to mimic common arson and terrorist bombing targets.  A 
comprehensive database enumerating and describing historical terrorist attacks is 
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available at the Terrorism Knowledge Base (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism (MIPT) 2006).    
 The first target profile centered on the area’s houses of worship and was intended 
to mimic an attack by religious extremists.  An actual recent example of this type of 
event includes the bombing of the Golden Mosque, a Shi’ite shrine in Iraq, and 
retaliatory arson attacks against Sunni mosques throughout Iraq (Knickmeyer and 
Ibrahim 2006).   This profile, abbreviated CHU, has three ignition points, and the 
locations of these ignition points are shown superimposed as pink triangles on a building 
map of Micropolis in Figure 4.7. 
 Potential targets for an ecoterrorist arson attack were considered next, and this 
attack profile was abbreviated as ECO in the simulation results.  Actual examples of 
ecoterrorist arson attacks are numerous, including the Earth Liberation Front’s alleged 
1998 arson against a Vail, Colorado, ski lodge and three ski lift buildings (Caldwell 
2006) and the same group’s 2004 arson attack against a West Jordan, Utah, lumber 
storage facility (Canham 2004).  The two ignition points chosen to model this type of 
attack in Micropolis were a lumberyard and a printing press, both located in the 
industrial area on the east side of town.  The locations of the ignition points are shown as 
green stars in Figure 4.7. 
Government and community buildings composed the targets for the third attack 
profile.  A prominent actual example of this type of attack is the 1995 bombing of the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (Johnston 1995).   The 
Micropolis government and community buildings selected as targets for simulated arson 
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attacks included City Hall, which houses most of the city’s government offices; the city 
post office; the community center; and a historic rail depot museum dedicated to the 
community’s history.  All four of these targets are located in the city’s central business 
district near the center of town.  This target profile was abbreviated GOV in the 
simulation results.  The targets in the GOV profile are shown as blue squares in Figure 
4.7. 
The community’s three school buildings were the targets for the next attack 
profile, which is abbreviated SCH in the simulation results.  A real example of this type 
of attack on an area’s schools is the 2004 Beslan school siege by Chechen separatists 
(BBC 2004), although that attack was a hostage seizure, not an arson attack.  Micropolis 
has an elementary school, located near the Central Business District, and a middle school 
and high school, which are located in the southwest corner of town.  These buildings are 
denoted by the red circle markers in Figure 4.7. 
The final target profile considered in this study is a collection of high-population 
gathering places within the community.  The most prominent example of this type of 
event is the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States (NCTAUS) 2004).  The high-population target profile, 
which is abbreviated as POP in the simulation results, has five ignition points: City Hall, 
the city’s three school buildings, and a movie theater located in the central business 
district.  This target profile’s distribution of ignition points is shown with orange stars in 
Figure 4.8.  A separate building map was needed to show this target profile clearly 
because it repeats some of the targets from the SCH and GOV target profiles. 
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Fig. 4.7. Ignition points for CHU, ECO, GOV, and SCH urban fire target profiles.  CHU ignition points 
are shown by pink triangles (3); ECO ignition points are shown by green stars (2); GOV ignition points are 
shown by blue squares (4); and SCH ignition points are shown by red circles (3). 
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Fig. 4.8. Ignition points for POP urban fire target profile.  POP ignition points are shown by maroon stars.   
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The selection of targets for each damage profile was highly subjective, and this 
phase of the vulnerability assessment underlines the importance of a broad 
understanding of the potential threats against the community. Other common targets for 
arson attacks include facilities like abortion clinics, police facilities, construction 
projects and/or business headquarters, transportation hubs, telecommunications hubs, 
and diplomatic facilities (MIPT 2006).  Because the range of potential targets is diverse, 
the selection of targets for MMAF simulation should be completed in consultation with 
experts familiar with the community, its mechanisms of emergency response, and its 
potential vulnerabilities. 
 
 
4.5. Simulation of Scenario-Based Urban Fires 
Using the water damage and urban fire scenarios described in Sections 4.3 and 
4.4, a wide variety of multi-mode attack and failure scenarios were simulated using the 
Model of Urban Fire Spread presented in Section 3 to provide insight into the possible 
range of consequences from this type of disaster.   
MUFS incorporates a great deal of information about the physical environment 
contributing to the urban fire, so in addition to a characterization of the water system 
damage and the urban fire ignition points, it was necessary to specify the prevailing wind 
speed and direction.  The original plans for this phase of the simulation called for a range 
of wind speed inputs, but preliminary results indicated that wind speed had a marginal 
effect on the consequences predicted by a long-term simulation.  Therefore, the wind 
speed was held constant at 10 mph (approximately 4.47 m/s) for all simulations.  A 
  
69
variety of wind directions were considered, since the magnitude of the urban fire’s 
spread distance depends on the prevailing wind direction.  In MUFS, wind directions are 
specified as the wind’s destination direction (not its origin direction, which is common 
meteorological practice) and due east is designated as 0 degrees, with directions 
increasing in the counter-clockwise direction.  Eight wind directions were considered in 
the simulations: the four cardinal directions 0 degrees (east), 90 degrees (north), 180 
degrees (west), and 270 degrees (south) and the four secondary directions (north-east, 
north-west, south-west, and south-east) offset 45 degrees from the cardinal directions).  
This convention is not consistent with standard meteorological practice; it is adopted to 
facilitate the vector mathematical operations used in model computations.  Future 
versions of the computer code written to facilitate simulation will conform to standard 
wind direction conventions. 
The scenario-based simulations varied three simulation parameters: wind 
direction, water system and other infrastructure damage profile, and ignition point target 
profile.  Thus, each simulation was specified as a unique direction/damage/target 
“triplet.”  This creates the potential for 880 unique damage scenarios, but the actual 
range of scenarios was limited somewhat to prevent redundant simulation of nearly-
identical scenarios and make the required simulation time more manageable  The 
average computation time for one direction/damage/target scenario, assuming an urban 
fire duration of 12 hours, was about one hour (using standard desktop personal 
computers); therefore, early efforts to decrease the required simulation time by 
eliminating nearly-redundant direction/damage/target triplets led to a considerable 
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savings in computational needs.  The direction/damage/target triplets actually simulated 
after elimination of redundancies are presented in Table 4.1.  For clarity, the 
infrastructure damage scenario component of the target profile/wind 
direction/infrastructure damage triplet is omitted from the table below.  Every 
infrastructure damage profile was simulated for each target profile/wind direction pair 
listed in Table 4.1.  This resulted in the simulation of 788 unique target profile/wind 
direction/infrastructure damage scenarios. (In addition, four simulations failed at runtime 
due to computer problems; this small number of simulation failures, equivalent to about 
one-half of one percent of the total simulations, was deemed to be negligible.)   
 
 
Table 4.1.  Target Profile/Wind Direction Combinations Simulated in Scenario-Based Vulnerability 
Analysis   
 Target 
Profile Wind Directions 
CHU 45, 90, 135,180, 225,270,315 
ECO All 
GOV All 
POP 0, 45, 90, 180, 225, 270, 315 
SCH 0, 45, 90 
 
 
Each of the direction/damage/target scenarios specified above were simulated 
using MUFS, following the process presented in Section 3.  The results of these 
simulations, including the range of damages predicted by the urban fire simulations and 
the process used to analyze the consequences and determine the most serious results, are 
presented in Section 5. 
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4.6. Optimization of Fire Ignition Points 
The work presented so far in this section used urban fire simulations based on 
clearly-delineated damage scenarios to predict the potential range of consequences of an 
attack or failure affecting fire response and one or more of its supporting infrastructures.  
The main disadvantage to this approach of simulating likely attack or disaster scenarios 
is that the success of the analysis depends heavily on accurate selection of the ignition 
points for the urban fire.  The experts selecting the ignition points may overlook some 
valid attack or disaster scenarios (including errors in execution of a correctly predicted 
terrorist attack).  Furthermore, it is impossible for any expert to predict every potential 
multi-mode attack and failure scenario which might affect a community.  Scenario-based 
vulnerability assessments of the type explained earlier in this section are useful because 
they provide insight into the range of possible consequences, but they may not be 
sufficient to describe the worst-case attack or disaster scenario. 
The possibility of overlooking a high-consequence multi-mode threat against the 
community prompted the use of an alternative method of determining the distribution of 
urban fire ignition points.  Several methods of optimization were tested as a means to 
find the highest-consequence distribution of fire ignition points.  Unlike the approach 
described in Section 4.4, this approach does not consider the likely mechanism of 
ignition; it makes no difference to the calculations whether the fires were caused by 
accident, arson, or natural disaster.  The goal of the optimization process is simply to 
find the spatial distribution of ignition points which causes the maximum damage; this is 
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important because insight into the worst-case scenario can help community leaders plan 
to avoid worst-case damages. 
Ideally, this type of analysis would consider each building in the urban area as a 
potential ignition point.  However, the amount of time required to run the full fire spread 
and suppression simulations for even a small number of simultaneous ignitions if the 
possible ignition locations are totally unrestricted is prohibitively high.  Preliminary 
calculations indicated that the optimization process for selecting only three ignition 
points from the 868 buildings in Micropolis would require many years of computation 
time.  Clearly, some simplification of the problem was needed in order to make it 
computationally feasible. 
 The first measure taken to simplify the optimization problem involved imposing 
some restrictions on the potential ignition points.  In actual practice, it may not make 
much difference in the simulation results if a large urban fire starts in one building or 
one of its immediate neighbors.  It is possible to reduce the scale of the problem by 
generalizing groups of buildings to a single representative structure.  The Micropolis 
buildings were represented by a grid of ten potential ignition buildings spaced 
approximately evenly: about 1000 feet apart.  These representative buildings were 
chosen based on their location and their similarity to other buildings in their immediate 
area.   
Because the fire spread and suppression simulation can be time-intensive, a 
sensitivity analysis was conducted on the level of detail included in the optimization 
calculations.  The purpose of the sensitivity analysis was to provide an understanding of 
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the tradeoff between model completeness and the computational resources required. 
Three different optimization methods were investigated in this phase of the project.   
 
4.6.1. Optimization Method 1: Dynamic Programming with a priori Damage 
Counts 
The first set of simulations used a dynamic programming algorithm to maximize 
the consequences of a three-ignition urban fire (with ignition points restricted to the ten 
possible ignition buildings described above).  For this option, the consequences of a fire 
starting at any given ignition point were determined individually for each possible 
ignition point before the optimization process.  This a priori determination of each 
ignition point’s consequences greatly improved the speed of the optimization 
calculations; each optimization run took only minutes on a desktop personal computer 
instead of hours or days to complete.  The consequences were determined using an 
unsuppressed fire spread simulation in the Model of Urban Fire Spread.  A medium-
duration (two hours) single-point urban fire was simulated separately for each ignition 
point, and the resulting list of burning buildings was saved as an input for the 
optimization model.  The fire spread simulations included only unsuppressed fire spread 
because, during normal simulation of a multi-ignition urban fire, fire suppression 
activities for one ignition point affect the resources available for suppressing the other 
ignition points’ fires.  The “costs” of fighting ignition points are not necessarily linearly 
additive; therefore, it is not possible to predict a multi-ignition fire’s response to fire 
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suppression by simulating each ignition point’s fire spread and suppression separately 
and later summing the results. 
The consequences of unsuppressed urban fires can be added linearly, however, as 
long as care is taken to prevent double-counting buildings which lie in two or more 
ignition points’ burn polygons.  To accomplish this, a short postprocessor function was 
implemented in Visual Basic 6 code to combine any number of ignition points’ burning 
building lists (generated automatically by MUFS as a simulation output), remove any 
redundant entries, and calculate the total number of displaced people from the combined 
building list.  The function determined which buildings appeared more than once based 
on each building’s unique ID number, which was part of the input information included 
in the building properties table described in Section 3. 
The worst-case distributions were determined by using a dynamic programming 
algorithm to optimize the placement of the ignition points to maximize the consequences 
of the resulting fire.  Dynamic programming is an optimization technique which 
considers a problem as a series of “stages,” or successive decisions.  In this problem, 
there were ten stages: one for each potential ignition point.  For each stage, the decision 
to be made was a simple yes/no choice of whether or not to ignite a fire at that ignition 
point.  In the equations below, the stage is indicated by the subscript k. 
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The dynamic programming problem is formulated in a series of equations as 
follows: 
Find uk, k = 1,2,3 …10      (4.1) 
     which 
∑
=
−−=
N
k
Nkdamage xxgJMax
1
2
max )(α    (4.2) 
      where 
 ∑ ⋅=
bldg
bldgbldgk vbg       (4.3) 
Subject to: x0 = 0      (4.4) 
xk+1  = xk + uk+1     (4.5) 
xmax = 3     (4.6) 
 
where uk is the decision variable for each stage, with possible values of 0 or 1; Jdamage is 
the total consequences of the combination of ignition points selected as described above; 
α is a weight on the penalty for incomplete deployment of resources (i.e. some number 
of ignitions different from the desired number); gk is the stagewise running gain; bbldg is 
a binary indicator of whether or not a building is burned by an ignition point 
combination’s fire polygon; vbldg is the value (number of occupants) of a building; and xk 
is the state variable for stage k. 
In dynamic programming terminology, the method for scoring the “goodness” of 
each set of decisions is called the “objective function.”  For this application, the 
objective function (equation 4.2) for any set of fire ignitions is a count of the people 
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displaced by the fires (Jdamage).  Its value is calculated using the ignition points’ 
associated burned building lists and the postprocessor function described above.  From 
the attacker’s perspective, higher values of the objective function are better than lower 
values, and the attacker’s goal is to get the highest possible value of the objective 
function (i.e. to maximize the consequences of the attack).  
The total number of “yes” decisions is constrained by the resources of the 
attacker; in this case, the attacker was assumed to have only three incendiary devices, so 
the maximum number of fires the attacker could ignite was limited to three (as shown in 
Equation 4.6).  In theory, the attacker could choose to set fewer than three fires.  Failure 
to use all of the available resources would not produce an optimal outcome, however, 
since the attacker is trying to maximize the damage inflicted by the multi-ignition fire.  
A human being with common sense would see this fact intuitively; to force the computer 
program to follow this logic, the program is instructed to impose a very large penalty 
(represented by α in Equation 4.2) for any final decision which does not use all the 
available resources. 
As the attacker considers, for each stage, whether or not to place the incendiary 
device at that location, the decision is affected by how many incendiary devices have 
already been placed at stages the attacker has already considered.  The count of how 
many fires have been ignited at any particular stage (including the fire set at the current 
stage, if applicable) is known as the “state,” and the state has a range of feasible values 
for each stage.  For example, for stages 3 through 10, the possible state values are 0, 1, 2, 
and 3.  (The state value cannot be greater than 3 because the attacker can only set a total 
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of three fires.)  At the earliest stages, the range of potential values is narrower; for 
example, at stage 2 the highest possible value for the state is 2, because the attacker 
cannot have set three fires at the two locations already considered.    
One of the main goals in designing and testing this method was to determine 
whether emergency planners can predict the relative severity of an urban fire event based 
on the results of medium-term unsuppressed fire spread calculations.  This approach is 
extremely fast but may involve an unacceptable simplification of the behavior of urban 
fires.  In addition, this approach is not intended to be used alone to predict the 
consequences of the worst-case fire scenario, but rather as a tool to identify the worst-
case scenario so that emergency planners can devote their time to studying that one 
scenario in more depth.  The main question under consideration in this step is: is an 
optimization process based on this type of extreme simplification of the multi-mode 
attack or failure actually capable of accurately pinpointing the worst-case distribution of 
urban fire ignition points?  The results of the dynamic programming optimization 
process and the answers to these questions about this technique’s useful application will 
be discussed in Section 5. 
 
4.6.2. Optimization Method 2: Dynamic Programming with Fire Suppression 
Included in Damage Calculations 
A fundamental assumption involved in using optimization method #1 is that it is 
possible to predict the suppressed severity of a multi-ignition urban fire based on a 
priori “snapshots” of the individual fires’ unsuppressed behavior.  The allocation of 
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resources for fire suppression is a complex process, however, so accurate prediction of 
the fires’ suppressed behavior based on their unsuppressed behavior may not actually be 
possible.  Optimization method #2 was implemented to test the validity of this 
assumption.  This method is considerably more time-consuming than optimization 
method #1, because the optimization procedure uses suppressed fire spread equations to 
calculate the damages of each ignition point, and the fire spread and suppression 
simulations must be run during the course of the dynamic program solution procedure.  
(Suppressed fire spread simulations cannot be run a priori, because the precise 
configuration of ignition points makes a difference in the final results of the simulation.)  
As a tradeoff for the added time and complexity required to solve the dynamic program, 
this optimization process is informed by more accurate and complete information about 
the urban fire and may produce more accurate results than optimization method #1.  The 
results of this procedure were compared with the results from optimization methods #1 
and #3 to provide insight into the tradeoff between expediency and accuracy. 
The dynamic program formulation for this optimization method was set up in a 
similar manner to the formulation described in Section 4.6.1 for optimization method #1.  
The only difference between the two model formulations is the methodology used to 
calculate the running gain function, which is the marginal number of displacements 
added to the total number of displacements by an ignition at the current stage.  The 
equation for the running gain for this model formulation is the same as the equation for 
the previous method (Equation 4.3), but the value of bbldg, an input to the running gain 
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equation, is determined using a MUFS simulation including the configuration of ignition 
points under consideration.   
 Like the previous method, this problem was formulated as a ten-stage dynamic 
program: in other words, a series of ten decisions (one for each potential ignition point) 
of whether or not to ignite an urban fire at each possible ignition point.  The attacker’s 
resources were assumed to be the same as for optimization method #1, so each stage has 
three possible states (corresponding to the number of fires set at all stages already 
considered, including the current stage).  The only difference between this method and 
the previous one is in the evaluation of the objective function, which is akin to a 
scorecard of each potential solution’s fitness.  For optimization method #1, the value of 
the objective function was determined by using the postprocessor function described in 
Section 4.6.1 to construct a combined burned building and calculate a combined damage 
count from the separate burn polygons of each of the ignition points under consideration. 
Optimization method #2 determines the value of the objective function by running a 
suppressed fire spread simulation in MUFS for each combination of ignition points 
considered by the dynamic programming algorithm.  Note that dynamic programming 
does not consider every potential combination of ignition points; the dynamic 
programming solution process guides the user away from combinations which are 
clearly sub-optimal.  Thus, this process is not equivalent to a total enumeration of all 
possible combinations of ignition points; this method will be discussed in Section 4.6.3. 
Because this method accounts for damage to the water system in its allocation of 
resources for fire suppression, it was necessary to specify a water system damage 
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scenario to use in the fire suppression simulations.  The dynamic program was solved 
using water system damage scenario D01 (destruction of the system’s elevated storage 
tank), which is described in detail in Section 4.3.3.  A wind speed of 10 mph, blowing 
due east, was specified for all related simulations.  To test the correctness of the solution, 
the dynamic program was solved six separate times varying the order of the stages; a 
correct solution algorithm will produce the same solution no matter what stage order is 
used.   
Solving the dynamic programming problem using full fire spread and 
suppression simulations to evaluate the objective function took much longer than using 
the a priori fire extent polygons; optimization method #2 required approximately twelve 
hours to deliver a solution running on a desktop personal computer.  In contrast, as 
mentioned in Section 4.6.1, optimization method #1 required only a few minutes to 
deliver a solution.  The methods’ respective results and accuracy are discussed in 
Section 5. 
 
4.6.3. Optimization Method #3: Total Enumeration of Possible Solutions 
By far the most time-consuming method of determining the most damaging 
configuration of urban fire ignition points is to consider each possible combination of 
three ignition points (from ten potential locations), simulate the fire resulting from each 
combination, tabulate the results, and choose the combination with the most serious 
damage.  This procedure was implemented as optimization method #3, a third alternative 
means of determining the worst-case urban fire scenario.  The main advantage to this 
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approach is that it is guaranteed to produce the worst-case combination of the potential 
ignition points.  The main disadvantage is that this method is computationally expensive; 
five days of continuous simulation on a desktop personal computer were required for this 
approach to deliver a solution.  The results of this optimization method are presented and 
discussed in Section 5, along with suggestions for future research into other possible 
optimization methods to expedite the solution of this problem.   
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5.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: ANALYSIS OF VULNERABILITY TO 
MULTI-MODE ATTACKS AND FAILURES 
 
5.1. Results of Scenario-Based MUFS Simulations 
The vulnerability analysis described in Section 4 required the simulation of a 
large number of multi-mode attack and failure (MMAF) scenarios to provide insight into 
the range of potential damages resulting from this type of attack or disaster.  Seven 
hundred eighty-eight distinct combinations of wind direction, infrastructure damage, and 
fire ignition point profiles were simulated for the scenario-based vulnerability analysis.  
The results of these simulations are summarized as a results matrix in Figure 5.1a. 
The numbers in Figure 5.1a reflect the number of people predicted to lose their 
home or place of employment because of the multi-mode attack or failure simulated in 
each scenario.  As an aid to interpreting the matrix, the cells are color-coded.  Figure 
5.1a consists of eight sub-matrices: one for each wind direction included in the 
simulations.  The wind direction is noted in the white cell at the upper-left corner of each 
sub-matrix.  The gray cells in the top row of each sub-matrix hold the abbreviations for 
the 23 water system or other support infrastructure failure scenarios described in Section 
4.  (In addition to these infrastructure damage scenarios, a twenty-fourth infrastructure 
damage profile was simulated as a basis for comparison, using an undamaged model of 
the Micropolis water distribution system with normal communications and transportation 
systems.  The abbreviation used to refer to this scenario is “UND,” for “undamaged”.)  
The gray cells in the first column of each sub-matrix in Figure 5.1a include the 
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abbreviations for each urban fire ignition point profile.  These ignition point profiles are 
explained in further detail in Section 4.  In order to avoid modeling redundant scenarios, 
not all ignition point profiles were modeled for every wind direction.  For example, the 
SCH target profile, which involves ignition points at each of the three school buildings, 
was only simulated for wind directions 0, 45, and 90. 
The cells containing the numerical results of the simulations are color-coded 
based on their severity.  Red cells represent scenarios producing consequences in the 95th 
or greater percentile of all simulations, which displaced 5,005 or more people from their 
homes and/or businesses.  These high-consequence scenarios are especially prevalent for 
the ECO ignition point profile with wind directions of 225 and 315 degrees.  Figure 5.1a 
shows that the highest damage level encountered for any scenario was 5,069 displaced 
persons, and this consequence value was shared by several wind direction/infrastructure 
damage/ignition point profiles.  (A displacement count of higher than 5,000 is possible, 
even though the population of Micropolis is 5,000, because people who lose both their 
home and place of employment because of the MMAF event are counted twice.  The 
maximum possible damage count is 6,999 displacements.)  Orange cells represent 
scenarios with consequences in the 75th or higher percentile (which displaced between 
3,298 and 5,004 people each).  Yellow cells show scenarios with consequences in the 
50th or higher percentile, with damages ranging from 2,210 to 3,297 displaced people.  
Blue cells contain the scenarios in the 25th or higher percentile, displacing 1,243 to 2,209 
people each.  Green cells contain the least severe scenarios, with consequences below 
the 25th percentile in magnitude (displacing 1,242 or fewer people).  
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Fig. 5.1a.  Results of scenario-based MMAF simulations. 
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Fig. 5.1a (Continued). 
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  Figure 5.1a clearly shows the relative severity of the scenarios’ results 
categorized by wind direction and fire ignition point profile.  To provide additional 
insight into the infrastructure damage scenarios’ consequences, the number of displaced 
people averaged over all ignition point profiles are presented for each damage scenario 
in Table 5.1, arranged in order of decreasing severity. 
 It is not surprising that the three most damaging entries in the list are 
infrastructure damage scenarios that involve compound failures: Scenario AD1, for 
example, includes damage both to the water system’s pumps and the elevated storage 
tank, and Scenarios BH1 and BH2 involve short-term pump inactivity and fire response 
delays caused by failures in the communications infrastructure. 
Table 5.1. Average MMAF Scenario Consequences by Infrastructure Damage Profile 
Scenario 
Name 
Average 
Consequences 
(Displaced People) 
Scenario 
Name 
Average 
Consequences 
(Displaced People) 
AD1 2848 F02 2260 
BH1 2781 AD2 2223 
BH2 2758 D02 2164 
A01 2692 H01 2054 
B02 2687 A02 2042 
B01 2680 B03 2009 
D01 2650 A03 2005 
G01 2411 E03mod 2002 
F03 2367 F04 1990 
F01 2344 UND 1978 
E04 2331 E02 1976 
E01 2306 F05 1962 
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It is also interesting to compare the average results for infrastructure damage 
scenarios which are similar except for a few key variables, in order to assess those 
variables’ effects on the consequences of the urban fire.  For example, Scenarios G01, 
H01, and UND all use the same hydraulic model of an undamaged water distribution 
system; the only difference is in the delay in fire response (30 minutes, 20 minutes, and 
10 minutes, respectively).  The large difference in consequences between Scenarios G01 
and UND underlines the importance of cities’ providing for speedy fire response even in 
the case of disaster. 
Even more striking is the difference in consequences between Scenario A01 
(which involves the destruction of all three of the water distribution system’s high-
service pumps) and Scenario A02 (which models the destruction of two of the three 
high-service pumps).  Keeping only one pump on-line reduces the average consequences 
of the urban fire by 650 displaced people: a reduction of nearly 25% from Scenario 
A01’s damage level.  This suggests that one important MMAF mitigation strategy for 
Micropolis to consider may be to provide for backup pump capacity so that the 
likelihood of at least one high-service pump remaining in service is increased.  The 
similarity of the average consequences of Scenarios A01, B02, and B01 – all of which 
involve the incapacity of all three high-service pumps, but for varying durations – shows 
that it is very important for Micropolis’s water utility not to allow its pumping capacity 
to cease completely even for a short time, particularly in the fire’s early stages.  
(Scenario B03, which takes the pumps offline temporarily two hours into the MMAF 
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simulation, is significantly less damaging than Scenarios A01, B02, and B01, which take 
the pumps offline at the beginning of the MMAF simulation.)    
A final observation on the relative importance of Micropolis’s two sources of 
water for firefighting (water supplied by the high-service pumps or stored in the elevated 
storage tank) suggests another possible mitigation measure to improve the city’s 
resistance to MMAFs.  It is interesting to note that the three scenarios (A01, B02, B01) 
which involve the initial incapacity of all of the high-service pumps are all more 
damaging on average than Scenario D01, which involves the destruction of the elevated 
storage tank at the beginning of the MMAF simulation.  This result was counter to 
preliminary predictions, because Micropolis’s water distribution system was designed to 
meet base-level, day-to-day water needs with the high-service pumps and use the 
elevated storage tank to provide surge capacity during high-use periods.  It seemed 
reasonable to expect that Scenario D01, which removes the fire department’s access to 
this surge capacity, would be one of the most damaging infrastructure failure scenarios.  
While this is not the case, Table 5.1 does show that the difference in average 
consequences between Scenario D01 and Scenario A01 (42 more people are displaced 
on average in Scenario A01 than Scenario D01) is not great in magnitude considering 
the overall effects of the disasters.  Therefore, Scenario D01 should still be considered a 
serious mode of infrastructure failure.  This finding suggests that another potential way 
to mitigate the effects of MMAFs involving urban fires and water utility damage would 
be to build redundant storage capacity in Micropolis’s water distribution system.  
Micropolis has only one elevated storage tank; thus, if the tank is destroyed the system 
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loses all of its storage capacity at once.  Building a second tank, even a smaller one, at a 
different location could be one possible way to decrease Micropolis’s vulnerability to 
this type of attack or failure. 
 Table 5.1 yields one final insight into potential mitigation measures to protect 
Micropolis from urban fire MMAFs.  Slightly further down the list of infrastructure 
damage scenarios ranked by average damage levels is a block of scenarios (F03, F01, 
E04, E01, F02) which involve the isolation of key sections of water main, either because 
of a water main breach or because of contamination of the water in the mains.  Isolation 
of zones within the water distribution system has two main effects on the system’s 
ability to handle fire suppression.  First, any fire hydrants within the isolated zone are cut 
off from outside water sources, which affects their ability to provide water for 
firefighting.  Second, water that would normally pass through the isolated area must take 
an alternate route, which causes greater head loss and may decrease the pressure 
available at hydrant nodes downstream of the isolated area.  While the zone isolation 
scenarios are not the most serious infrastructure failure scenarios tested, their 
consequences are still significantly higher than the MMAF scenario modeled with an 
undamaged water distribution system.  This raises the possibility that a mitigation 
measure designed to bridge the isolated zones, both to bring water to the isolated 
hydrants and to lessen the need for alternate routes around the zones, could help decrease 
the consequences of this type of event.  This potential mitigation measure will be 
discussed further in Section 6, along with the other possible mitigation measures 
described in this section. 
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5.2 Selection of Attack Scenarios for Mitigation 
 Section 5.1 includes suggestions for mitigation measures based on the most 
serious infrastructure failure scenarios, but it is still necessary to select the wind 
direction/infrastructure damage/target profile scenarios used to test the mitigation 
measures.  The main goal of this project is to identify water and other support 
infrastructure mitigation measures to protect the community against urban fire MMAFs; 
water utilities and emergency planners are presumed to have a much higher degree of 
control over the water distribution system and other support infrastructures than over the 
targets chosen by terrorists or the wind direction at the time of the attack.  Therefore, it is 
advisable to test the mitigation measures against the most damaging combinations of 
target profile and wind direction to verify their effectiveness. 
Figure 5.1a provides some idea of the relative severity of the various scenarios, 
but in order to identify the most damaging target profiles and wind directions it is 
advisable  to examine the simulation results differently.  Figure 5.1b shows the results of 
this parallel analysis.  The consequences of the MMAF simulations are plotted on the 
vertical axis, and each combination of target profile and wind direction are contained in 
a separate data series.  (Thus, each row in Figure 5.1a is a separate data series in Figure 
5.1b.)  
The scenarios within each wind direction/target profile category are sorted in 
order of increasing magnitude, so that the horizontal scale in Figure 5.1b reflects each 
scenario’s percentile ranking within its direction/target category.  (Scenarios plotted 
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further to the right are higher in magnitude than scenarios plotted further to the left on 
the same line.)  
Plotting all this data on one set of axes yields a complicated graph, but it does 
permit the analyst to identify several distinct “tiers” of wind direction/target profile 
category damages.  The data series plotted in Figure 5.1b were interpreted to fall into 
three horizontal bands, and this separation between the damage levels was used to select 
the most damaging wind direction/target profile combinations to test the mitigation 
strategies in the next phase of the project.  The top band in Figure 5.2 is relatively 
narrow and contains data series with a large number of scenarios resulting in more than 
5,000 displacements.  Four wind direction/target profile categories fall into this band: 
ECO 45 (that is, the combination of the ECO group of ignition points with a wind 
direction of 45 degrees), ECO 135, ECO 225, and ECO 315. 
The next natural grouping of wind direction/target profile categories occurs for 
the series whose scenarios cause approximately 3,300 to 4,000 displacements.  This 
second tier includes six additional wind direction/target profile categories: GOV 45, 
GOV 225, GOV 270, GOV 315, POP 225, and POP 315.   
Below the second tier the graph becomes significantly more jumbled and 
individual categories are more difficult to characterize in terms of overall damage levels.  
However, this analysis technique was helpful in identifying the ten categories in the top 
two tiers.  Scenarios in these high-consequence categories were used to test the 
effectiveness of the proposed mitigation strategies, and this process is explained in 
further detail in Section 6. 
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Fig. 5.1b.  Graph of MMAF simulation results separated by target group/wind direction. 
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5.3. MMAF Fire Spread Profiles: Visualizing Burned Area Extent 
 Characterizing MMAF scenarios’ severity in terms of the number of people 
displaced by the fire is a useful metric, but this is by no means the only way to describe 
the scenarios.  Plotting the fires’ progress over time provides insight into the fire’s 
behavior and the success of firefighting efforts at various locations in the urban area.   
 Figures 5.2 through 5.6 show the differences in fire behavior for a range of high-
consequence and low-consequence MMAF scenarios.  Figure 5.2 shows the progress of 
the urban fire over time for the ECO target profile with wind blowing into the southwest 
and infrastructure damage scenario B01.  This scenario, which displaced 5,069 people, is 
one of the most damaging MMAF scenarios modeled in this phase of the vulnerability 
analysis and is listed as one of the red-shaded scenarios in the 95th percentile of 
consequences in Table 5.1.  It may be surprising that an urban fire started by an ignition 
point profile with a relatively low number of ignition points – two ignition locations, in 
contrast to the four points modeled using the GOV target profile or the five points 
modeled using the POP profile – but several factors contribute to the high level 
consequences of this MMAF scenario.  First, the ECO targets are located in an area of 
high building and population density, so there is more fuel to burn and more people to be 
affected by the fire than if it were located in the less-dense eastern half of town.  Both 
ECO targets are located in the town’s industrial district, where many of the buildings 
have low Occupancy Hazard Classification values (i.e., high hazard for fire).  Thus, a 
fire which consumes the buildings in the industrial district may require more than twice 
as much water to extinguish as one which burns residential or government buildings 
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which are comparable in size.  In addition, Table 5.2 shows that water system damage 
profile B01 is one of the more serious water system damage scenarios.  The combination 
of low-OHC buildings near the ignition points and high-consequence water system 
damage means that the stressed water distribution system can supply only a limited 
amount of water for firefighting, and the suppression is not as effective as it would be in 
a residential or commercial section of town.   
 Comparing the unsuppressed and suppressed burn profiles shown in Figure 5.2a 
and Figure 5.2b provides insight into the effectiveness of the fire suppression at various 
times.  The suppressed and unsuppressed fire areas at the end of the simulation are the 
same; for this infrastructure damage scenario, the fire is never fully suppressed, and fire 
progress stops only when the fire reaches the boundaries of the urban area in all of its 
fire spread directions.  However, the time it takes to cover the full burn area is 
considerably longer in the suppressed case.  With the exception of the red innermost 
polygon, which shows the fire’s extent before the fire department begins fighting the 
fire, the polygons are spaced at equal sixty-minute intervals.  The wider bands of color 
visible at each time step in the unsuppressed case mean that the fire is moving 
considerably faster – that is, covering more area in the same amount of time – than in the 
suppressed case.  Because of this, the suppressed fire takes longer to consume the 
affected area, which gives emergency managers longer to evacuate the buildings on the 
outer reaches of the affected area. 
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Figure 5.2a: Unsuppressed Fire Area, ECO Target profile, wind 10 mph at 225 degrees.
Figure 5.2b: Suppressed Fire Area, ECO Target profile, wind 10 mph at 225 degrees, 
water system damage scenario B01
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Fig. 5.2a.  Unsuppressed fire area, ECO target profile, wind 10 mph at 225 degrees. 
Fig. 5.2b.  Suppressed fire area, ECO target profile, wind 10 mph at 225 degrees, water system 
damage scenario B01. 
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Figures 5.3a and 5.3b show another example of an urban fire which was 
ultimately stopped not by fire suppression but by the boundaries of the urban area; this 
example was selected from the orange-shaded scenarios in the 75th percentile of damages 
shown in Table 5.1.  This MMAF scenario involved an urban fire started in four of the 
government buildings located in the town’s central business district (GOV ignition 
profile), with wind blowing into the northeast and damage to the city’s elevated storage 
tank (infrastructure damage profile D01).  This scenario’s burned area progress through 
time also shows that, while the partially-effective fire suppression never stops the fire, it 
slows it down and provides added time for building evacuation.  Figure 5.3b gives an 
interesting graphical demonstration of differences in the sectors’ ability to fight fires 
effectively.  The northwest part of the burned area in Figure 5.3b shows much higher 
effectiveness in the fire suppression – that is, the bands of color are narrower and the fire 
takes longer to reach the end of the urban area – than the southeastern portion of the 
burned area in Figure 5.3b.  Some additional information about the functioning of the 
Micropolis water distribution system can explain the differences in fire suppression 
effectiveness.  The northwestern part of the burned area is served by the main trunk line 
of the distribution system, and this is one of the highest pressure zones in the distribution 
system because the water has just left the high-service pumps downstream of the water 
treatment plant and has not yet lost much of its energy to friction.  In addition, fire 
hydrants are plentiful in this area, so there are ample locations for the fire trucks to get 
the water they need to fight the fire.  In contrast, the southeastern part of the burned area 
is supplied with water at a lower pressure because the water loses energy to friction on  
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Figure 5.3b: Suppressed Fire Area, GOV Target profile, wind 10 mph at 45 degrees, 
water system damage scenario D01.
Figure 5.3a: Unsuppressed Fire Area, GOV Target profile, wind 10 mph at 45 degrees.
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. 5.3a   Unsuppressed fir  area, GOV target profile, wind 10 mph at 45 degrees. 
Fig. 5.3b.  Suppressed fire area, GOV target profile, wind 10 mph at 45 degrees, water system 
damage scenario D01. 
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the circuitous path it must take from the water treatment plant to the fire hydrant.  In 
addition, fire hydrants are comparatively sparse in that area of the city, placing a greater 
strain on the hydrants that are available.  The result of these differences in the state of 
the water distribution system at the two locations is that the northwestern sector has 
more water available for firefighting, and it experiences more effective fire suppression.  
The southeastern sector has less water available at pressures adequate for firefighting, so 
the firefighting activity is less effective at reducing the fire’s rate of spread. 
Figures 5.4a  and 5.4b show a moderate-consequence urban fire; this scenario 
was chosen from the yellow-shaded 50th damage percentile and caused the displacement 
of 3,118 people.  This MMAF scenario involved an urban fire starting at the city’s three 
school buildings, with wind blowing at 10 mph into the northeast.  Because this 
scenario’s infrastructure damage profile was long-term damage to all three of the water 
system’s high-service pumps, the only source of water for firefighting is the city’s 
elevated storage tank.  Figure 5.4b clearly shows the effects of this limited water supply.  
Examining the fire polygons originating from the ignition point closest to the center of 
town shows that the fire suppression is effective at slowing the rate of the fire’s spread in 
the early hours of the simulation.  Particularly after 240 minutes, however, the bands of 
incremental fire area for each time step grow wider, which means the rate of fire spread 
increases.  Examining the hydraulic output of the water distribution system model for 
this scenario shows that the elevated storage tank is completely empty by 255 minutes, 
so it is reasonable to conclude that the change in fire spread rate is caused by exhausting 
the supply of water for firefighting. 
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Figure 5.4b: Suppressed Fire Area, SCH Target profile, wind 10 mph at 45 degrees, 
water system damage scenario A01
Figure 5.4a: Unsuppressed Fire Area, SCH Target profile, wind 10 mph at 45 degrees.
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Fig. 5.4a.  Unsuppressed fire area, SCH target profile, wind 10 mph at 45 degrees. 
Fig. 5.4b.  Suppressed fire area, SCH target profile, wind 10 mph at 45 egrees, water system 
damage scenario A01. 
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Figures 5.5a and 5.5b show the urban fire resulting from ignition points at the area’s 
greatest population centers, with the wind blowing at 10 mph into the east.  This scenario 
is a relatively low-consequence scenario, selected from the blue-shaded (25th damage 
percentile) category in Table 5.1.  This scenario displaced 1,983 people.  Figure 5.5b 
clearly demonstrates the impact of effective fire suppression early in the disaster.  The 
figure shows that the easternmost fire ignition point’s fire is completely suppressed in 
the downwind direction after one hour.  This early suppression saves almost the entire 
industrial district – the area covered by the unsuppressed burn polygon associated with 
that ignition point -- from being burned.  Totally effective suppression is achieved after 
two hours of simulation time for the urban fire associated with the middle school, which 
is on the western edge of the urban area.  While the fire’s suppression does not 
ultimately save the adjoining residential area from being burned – it is eventually 
reached by the fire from another ignition point – this early suppression pushes back the 
damage by about seven hours, giving area residents additional time to evacuate. 
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Figure 5.5b: Suppressed Fire Area, POP Target profile, wind 10 mph at 0 degrees, 
water system damage scenario D02
Figure 5.5a: Unsuppressed Fire Area, POP Target profile, wind 10 mph at 0 degrees.
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Fig. 5.5a.  Unsuppressed fire area, POP target profile, wind 10 mph at 0 degrees. 
Fig. 5.5b.  Suppressed fir  area, POP target profile, wind 10 mph at 0 degrees, w ter system 
damage scenario D02. 
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Figures 5.6b, another low-consequence MMAF scenario, provides even more 
examples of the benefit of early totally-effective suppression.  This scenario features an 
attack on the area’s houses of worship with wind blowing at 10 mph into the northwest.  
It was selected from the green-shaded scenarios in Table 5.1, and this scenario displaced 
696 people.  As Figure 5.6a shows, the unsuppressed burned area is quite large and 
stretches into the highest-density residential area in the north-central part of town.  
However, totally-effective suppression halted the fire’s spread in the sidewind-right 
direction for all three ignition points, cutting off the fire’s potential to threaten the high-
density residential area and the high-density central business district.  Totally effective 
suppression in the sidewind-left direction for the westernmost ignition point kept that 
target’s fire from engulfing the middle school, another high-consequence building.  
Effective suppression kept the fire away from high-population-density areas, which is 
the reason for the scenario’s low overall consequences and the dramatic reduction in area 
between the unsuppressed and suppressed fire spread simulations.  
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Figure 5.6b: Suppressed Fire Area, CHU Target profile, wind 10 mph at 135 degrees, 
water system damage scenario E01.
Figure 5.6a: Unsuppressed Fire Area, CHU Target profile, wind 10 mph at 135 degrees.
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Fig. 5.6a.  Unsuppressed fire area, CHU target profile, wind 10 mph at 135 degrees. 
Fig. 5.6b.  Suppressed fire area, CHU target profile, wind 10 mph at 135 degrees, wa er system 
damage scenario E01. 
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5.4. Using Dynamic Programming to Find Worst-Case Ignition Point Placement 
 Applying the technique of dynamic programming to the placement of urban fire 
ignition points to determine the worst-case MMAF scenario was more complicated than 
was originally anticipated.  The fact that the burned-area polygons may overlap, but 
buildings may only burn once, means that the incremental damage caused by choosing to 
place an incendiary device at any particular ignition point depends not only on the 
number of incendiary devices already placed (the state) but where they were placed (the 
decision history).  It is difficult to account for this added level of complexity with the 
traditional dynamic programming technique. 
 A modified form of dynamic program could be developed to solve this type of 
problem, where the incremental gain is defined explicitly a priori for each possible 
combination of burn polygons.  Figure 5.7 on page 91 helps illustrate this technique.  
Instead of determining before the solution that the incremental value of starting the fire 
that causes burn polygon 5 (purple polygon) is a single value – for example, 250 people 
displaced – the algorithm could be instructed to use an incremental gain value of 225 if 
an incendiary device has already been placed at point 4, or a value of 230 if one has been 
placed at ignition point 3, or a value of 210 if one has already been placed at ignition 
point 6.  Since two incendiary devices may already have been placed when the algorithm 
reaches ignition point 5, the analyst would similarly need to determine the incremental 
damage caused by setting a fire at point 5 if fires have already been started at all possible 
two-ignition-point combinations of point 3, point 4, and point 6 – these are all of the 
polygons that intersect polygon 5 in Figure 5.7.  This process would have to be repeated 
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for every potential ignition point to construct a conditional incremental-gain table to be 
used in calculating the running gain during the dynamic programming solution.  The 
considerable added effort involved in conducting this analysis defeats the purpose of 
using dynamic programming and a priori damage calculations to simplify the 
optimization process, so this technique is not recommended for use in determining the 
worst-case placement of urban fire ignition points. 
 
5.5.  Optimizing Ignition Point Placement by Enumeration 
The total enumeration optimization method described in Section 4.6.3 
successfully located the worst-case arrangement of urban fire ignition points for wind 
blowing into the east at 10 mph and infrastructure damage scenario D01, which involves 
the destruction of the elevated storage tank at the beginning of the simulation.  The 
worst-case ignition point placement, shown in Figure 5.8 on the next page, displaces 
6,778 people, which is greater than the population of Micropolis because many of the 
disaster victims lose both their home and their workplace to the fire.  This scenario is 
particularly damaging because the fire ignition points are located mainly in the high 
population density areas of town and in areas where the route of water from the 
treatment plan to the local hydrants is impeded by low-diameter pipes.  This limits the 
effectiveness of fire suppression, although the suppression is still partially effective at 
decreasing the rate of fire spread.  The extent of the burned area over time is shown in 
Figure 5.9a and 5.9b.  
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Fig. 5.7.  Illustration of challenges of solving the ignition point placement problem using dynamic 
programming techniques. 
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Fig. 5.8.  Location of the worst-case ignition point arrangement.  Ignition points are indicated by red 
circles.  Non-optimal ignition points are indicated by gray circles. 
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Figure 5.9b: Suppressed Fire Area, optimized ignition points, wind 10 mph at 0 degrees,
water system damage scenario D01.
Figure 5.9a: Unsuppressed Fire Area, optimized ignition points, wind 10 mph at 0 degrees.
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Fig. 5.9a.  Unsuppressed fire area, optimized ignition points, wind 10 mph at 0 degrees. 
Fig. 5.9b.  Suppressed fire area, optimized ignition points, wind 10 mph at 0 degrees, water system 
damage scenario D01. 
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5.6. Conclusion 
 The results of the extensive MMAF damage scenarios provide good insight into 
the possible scope of an attack or disaster involving an urban fire with damage to one or 
more community infrastructures.  The severity of many of these MMAF scenarios 
clearly indicate the need for measures to mitigate the damage against the water systems 
and other support infrastructures, thereby increasing their ability to function in disasters 
even under heavy damage.  The results of this analysis also suggest a variety of possible 
mitigation measures, as shown in Table 5.2 and discussed in Section 5.1.  This 
discussion of potential mitigation measures continues in Section 6, which addresses the 
methodology of designing potential measures and testing their effectiveness against 
multi-mode attacks and failures.   
 
  
109
6.  METHODOLOGY: MITIGATING MULTI-MODE 
ATTACKS AND FAILURES 
 
6.1.  Introduction: Importance of Mitigating Infrastructure Damage 
The primary goal of the study presented in this dissertation is to develop and test 
measures to mitigate damage to the support infrastructures which contribute to effective 
fire response, especially the water distribution system.  Mitigating potential multi-mode 
attacks or failures (MMAFs) is an important step in protecting communities against 
complex attacks and disasters.  In general, mitigation techniques provide passive 
protection against attacks or failures, minimizing the damages and disruption of services 
which accompany disasters by increasing infrastructures’ physical resistance to damage 
(Tierney, Lindell, and Perry 2001).   Mitigation complements traditional security 
measures like guards, fences, and security cameras around important system assets.  
These traditional measures decrease the likelihood of a successful attack against support 
infrastructures; the mitigation measures modeled here decrease the consequences of an 
attack or failure which thwarts the traditional security measures and actually takes place.   
The mitigation measures studied in this phase were designed based on the most 
serious modes of infrastructure damage revealed by the unmitigated MMAF simulations 
described in Sections 4 and 5.  This section presents seven potential mitigation measures 
and the methodology used to test their effectiveness against MMAFs.  The results of this 
analysis are presented in Section 7. 
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6.2.   Design of Mitigation Measures 
Table 5.2, which identifies the most damaging support infrastructure damage 
scenarios, can help suggest mitigation measures to counter the effects of the most serious 
damage scenarios.  These most serious damage modes were incorporated into the design 
of the mitigation measures presented in this section.  In addition, common impediments 
to effective firefighting (e.g. loss of pressure caused by inadequately-sized water mains, 
lack of sufficient fire trucks, etc.) were also considered in the mitigation design process.  
Seven mitigation measures were developed and tested for their effectiveness against the 
MMAF scenarios described in Section 4.   
 
6.2.1.  Mitigation Method M01: Enlarging All Water Mains 
Hydraulic simulations of the Micropolis water distribution system under fire flow 
demands show significant pressure loss when water must pass through low-diameter 
mains, particularly the system’s 2-inch and 4-inch diameter mains.  This pressure loss is 
caused by increased friction with the pipe walls in small-diameter pipes, and lost water 
pressure in the water distribution system can cause a decrease in the amount of water 
available at firefighting pressures.  To decrease friction-caused pressure loss, the first 
mitigation method investigated the effect of replacing with 12-inch ductile iron pipe all 
water main sections with a diameter of less than 12 inches, which is the largest pipe 
diameter present in the Micropolis water distribution system.  This measure requires the 
replacement of about 38,000 feet of pipe, at an estimated cost of $1.8 million for the 
materials and labor involved in excavating, replacing, and backfilling the pipe sections.   
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Fig. 6.1. Water mains to be replaced in mitigation method M01.  Red lines show mains which are less 
than 12 inches in diameter; these are replaced by 12-inch ductile iron pipes in the M01 scenario. 
 
 
This estimate is presented in 2005 dollars and is derived from cost data from Mechanical 
Cost Data 1997, also known as the Means Manual (R.S. Means Company 1996), with 
costs adjusted for inflation.  The water mains affected by this proposed mitigation 
measure are shown in a schematic diagram of the water distribution system’s hydraulic 
model in Figure 6.1. 
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6.2.2. Mitigation Method M02: Enlarging 2-Inch Water Mains 
 The high cost of implementing mitigation method M01 raised the concern that 
water utilities would be unable to finance such an extensive water main replacement 
project even if it were shown to be highly effective at improving the water distribution 
system’s ability to resist multi-mode attacks and failures (MMAFs).  A lower-cost 
alternative is to replace only the smallest mains in the water distribution system, since 
these pipes are the ones which cause the most energy loss in the system.  Accordingly, 
mitigation method M02 was designed to test the effectiveness of this strategy.  The 
Micropolis water distribution system includes about 4.300 feet of 2-inch diameter cast 
iron pipe, located mainly in the central business district and the residential areas 
immediately adjacent.  This area contains the city’s oldest buildings, and the small-
diameter cast iron pipes are artifacts of the city’s original water distribution installed 
circa 1910 (Brumbelow et al. 2006), before modern water system design and firefighting 
practices were developed.  Mitigation method M02 involves replacing the 2-inch water 
mains with 12-inch diameter ductile iron mains, which are the standard water mains used 
in the city’s most recent water distribution systems expansions.  The cost of this 
mitigation method is estimated at approximately $200,000 in 2005 dollars (R.S. Means 
Company 1996).  The water mains affected by this mitigation measure are shown in 
Figure 6.2. 
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Fig. 6.2. Water mains to be replaced in mitigation method M02.  Red lines show mains which are 2 
inches in diameter; these are replaced by 12-inch ductile iron pipes in the M02 scenario. 
 
 
 
6.2.3. Mitigation Method M03: Voluntary Water Conservation 
 Fire flow demands are large compared to a typical household’s or business’s 
base-level water usage.  The large number of households and businesses in Micropolis 
compared to the possible number of fire demands raises the possibility that the water 
used for base-level demands may decrease the water available for fire fighting during 
high-demand periods.  Mitigation measure M03 was designed to test the impact of base-
level demands on the water system’s ability to provide water for fire fighting and the 
effect of a voluntary water-conservation order during the disaster response period. 
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 The water-conservation order was assumed to reduce all base-level demands to 
half their pre-conservation levels.  This mitigation measure does not include any 
physical change to the water distribution system, but it is assumed that a successful 
conservation order must be prefaced by a public education campaign explaining the 
reason for emergency conservation measures and their potential benefit.  This education 
campaign may include measures like television advertisements, paid advertisements in 
local newspapers, and inserts in water utility customer bills.  In addition to the cost of 
producing these items, one or more city employees’ time would be required to draft 
these materials.  The cost of this education campaign is estimated very roughly at 
$50,000.  
 
6.2.4. Mitigation Method M04: Auxiliary Elevated Water Storage Tank 
 The analysis of the most serious water infrastructure damage scenarios presented 
in Section 5.1 highlights the importance of the surge capacity provided by the water 
distribution system’s single elevated storage tank in helping the fire department meet fire 
flow demands.  Several of the support infrastructure damage scenarios involve the 
destruction of the elevated storage tank, however, and the damages associated with this 
profile were often high.  Many other damage scenarios preserved the fire department’s 
access to the storage tank, but their consequences increased when the tank was drained 
as a result of prolonged fire fighting demands.  Mitigation measure M04 investigates the 
benefits of additional water storage capacity for use in fire response. 
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 Mitigation scenario M04 includes a second elevated storage tank, approximately 
half the size of the main tank, located on the eastern edge of town.  The auxiliary tank is 
located away from the main tank so that an event which compromises one tank may not 
affect the other tank.  The eastern side of town was chosen as the auxiliary tank’s 
location because hydraulic simulations of the water distribution system indicate that the 
residential areas on the east side are most likely to experience lowered water pressure 
during peak demand periods.  These zones are the most hydraulically distant from the 
water treatment plant and high-service pumps, so loss of pressure caused by friction with 
pipe walls is most pronounced in this area..  Thus, the auxiliary water tank may present a 
dual benefit: increased water for firefighting during emergencies and improved service 
quality during non-emergency usage.  
 The auxiliary tank’s location is shown in Figure 6.3.  The tank’s capacity is 
approximately 375,000 gallons.  The estimated cost of constructing the tank is $475,000 
in 2005 dollars, based on construction cost estimates from Mechanical Cost Data 1997 
(R.S. Means Company 1996) and adjusted for inflation. 
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Fig. 6.3. Location of auxiliary elevated water storage tank for mitigation method M04.  The auxiliary tank 
is circled in red and is located on the eastern edge of town. 
 
 
6.2.5. Mitigation Method M05: Additional Mutual Aid Fire Response  
 Fire departments typically plan in advance to deal with fires that overwhelm their 
own resources by creating mutual aid contracts with nearby communities. (Eckman 
1994)  Accounting for resources arising from mutual aid is why the Model of Urban Fire 
Spread uses a time-varying number of available fire trucks.  Since MUFS uses two 
different types of firefighting resources – available fire trucks and water – to calculate 
the effectiveness of the fire suppression, it is possible that securing additional fire trucks 
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through mutual aid contracts could help more effectively contain the urban fires 
resulting from high-consequence multi-mode attacks and failures. 
 Mitigation measure M05 was designed to investigate the effect of additional 
mutual aid resources on fire suppression effectiveness for the MMAF scenarios studied 
here.  This mitigation measure doubles the number of fire trucks available through 
mutual aid contracts.  The number of trucks available immediately (the community’s 
own firefighting resources) does not change.  A time series of the fire trucks available 
over time for this mitigation measure is shown in Figure 6.4.  This mitigation measure is 
assumed to have negligible cost of implementation. 
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Fig. 6.4. Time series of fire trucks available in Micropolis using mitigation measure M05. 
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6.2.6. Mitigation Method M06: Auxiliary High-Service Pump Station 
 The analysis of most serious water infrastructure damage scenarios presented in 
Section 5.1 highlighted the importance of the water utility maintaining at least one high-
service pump operating during the fire fighting operation.  The system’s three high-
service pumps are all located at the same site, however, so an attack or failure which 
compromises one pump is more likely to affect all three pumps than if they are located 
separately. 
 Mitigation measure M06 installs a fourth high-service pump located far away 
from the three main pumping stations as part of an auxiliary water supply connection.  
The pipeline is 5,700 feet long and is constructed of 12-inch diameter ductile iron pipe, 
which is the standard large-diameter pipe used in Micropolis’s most modern water 
supply lines.  The auxiliary pump is identical to the three primary high-service pumps.  
The installation cost of the pipeline and pumping station are estimated at $240,000 in 
2005 dollars (Abelin, Pritchard, and Sanks 2006).  The locations of the pump and 
pipeline are shown in Figure 6.5.  Water in this auxiliary supply line runs from the water 
treatment plant along the north edge of town to the pump and connection to the water 
distribution system, which are located in the residential area in the northeastern quadrant 
of Micropolis. 
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Fig. 6.5. Auxiliary water supply pipeline and pump for mitigation method M06.  The auxiliary pipeline is 
shown as a red line.  The auxiliary high service pump is circled in red.  The location of the three primary 
high service pumps is circled in blue. 
 
 In addition to providing backup pumping capacity for fire response in case the 
primary pumping station is damaged, this mitigation measure has the dual benefit of 
improving water pressure in the northeastern quadrant of town.  As discussed in Section 
6.2.4, that area of Micropolis is the most likely to experience lower water pressure 
during periods of peak demand, because the water must travel long distances, often 
through low-diameter pipes, to reach the area.  The auxiliary supply line, which provides 
a more direct route (through a large diameter pipe) from the water treatment plant to the 
northeastern residential zone, serves as a bypass to this circuitous route and decreases 
the likelihood of unsatisfactory water pressure during daily high-demand periods.  
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6.2.7. Mitigation Method M07: Portable Above-Ground Emergency Water Mains 
 The final conclusion of the analysis of the most serious support infrastructure 
damage scenarios in Section 5.1 was that the scenarios which involve isolation of areas 
of the water system (damage profiles E and F from Sections 4.3.5 and 4.3.6) present a 
dual impediment to effective fire response.  The isolation denies water to any fire 
hydrants located in the isolated zone, preventing them from contributing to fire response.  
In addition, damage scenarios like F01 that block heavy-use water mains force water 
traveling to other areas to take a circuitous alternate route, increasing the loss of energy 
due to friction with pipe walls and potentially decreasing the available flow of water at 
the pressure needed for fire fighting. 
 One potential solution to the problems raised by isolating sections of the water 
distribution system is for communities to run temporary, portable water mains above the 
ground to serve as alternate paths for water which would normally pass through the 
isolated area.  These temporary water mains could also be run from working hydrants to 
hydrants inside the isolated area to provide a source of water for fire fighting if needed.  
This solution is modeled here as mitigation measure M07.   
 The temporary pipelines are modeled as running between fire hydrants, because 
fire hydrants are easily accessible from above ground and serve as convenient access 
points to the water distribution system.  The temporary mains were modeled as 10-inch 
diameter hoses with rubber interior walls, since it was hypothesized that extended 
lengths  of large-diameter fire hoses could be used for this purpose.  This mitigation 
measure is assumed to have a negligible implementation cost, since it involves the 
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temporary redeployment of resources the fire department probably already possesses.  
The precise configuration of temporary mains differed for each damage scenario, and the 
configuration would probably be determined ad hoc by the fire department and water 
utility in the event of a real emergency.  An example of the hydraulic model which 
includes temporary mains is shown in Figure 6.6.   
 
 
Fig. 6.6. Micropolis water system under damage scenario E04 mitigated by measure M07.  Sections 
blocked by water main breaches are shown in the blue-hatched areas.  Temporary water mains are shown 
by red lines.  Dominant directions of water flow through temporary mains are shown by green arrows. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
122
6.3 Simulation of Multi-Mode Attacks and Failures with Mitigation Measures in 
Place 
 Modeling every infrastructure damage scenario, or even every high-consequence 
damage scenario, with every mitigation measure would require an extraordinary 
commitment of computational resources.  However, as with the unmitigated 
infrastructure damage scenarios, simulating a subset of the mitigated damage scenarios 
can still provide insight into the effectiveness of the various mitigation measures. 
 The analysis of most serious target profile/wind direction combinations in 
Section 5.2 identified ten combinations with consequences falling consistently above 
3,300 displaced people.  These ten combinations of target profile and wind direction 
were combined with selected infrastructure damage scenarios to test the effectiveness of 
the mitigation methods described in the previous section.  The infrastructure 
damage/target profile/wind direction “triplets” tested against the mitigation scenarios are 
shown in Table 6.1.  Each of the most serious target/wind direction combinations are 
shown in the left column, with the infrastructure damage scenarios modeled in 
conjunction with these combinations listed in the right column.  Thus, urban fire MMAF 
scenarios involving the ECO ignition point group and a wind direction of 45 degrees 
(top row) were modeled with all combinations of the mitigation methods and 
infrastructure damage scenarios D01 and G01.  The combinations of target profile, wind 
direction, and infrastructure damage scenarios were chosen to give a representative 
sample of of the most serious MMAF damage triplets against which the mitigation 
measures could be tested.  Ideally, every mitigation method would be tested against 
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every MMAF damage scenario, but the resulting simulations would be prohibitively 
computationally expensive.  (Each mitigation simulation took approximately one and a 
half hours to run on a personal desktop computer.)   
 
Table 6.1.  Damage Scenarios Used in Analysis of Mitigation Method Effectiveness 
Target Profile and 
Wind Direction 
Mitigation Methods Tested 
against these Infrastructure 
Damage Scenarios:  
ECO 45 D01, G01 
ECO 135 A01, F02 
ECO 225 B01, F03 
ECO 315 A01, BH2 
GOV 45 BH1, F04 
GOV 225 A03, H01 
GOV 270 B02, E02 
GOV 315 E01, E03 
POP 225 AD1, D02 
POP 315 D01, F05 
 
 
Each mitigation measure was modeled separately by incorporating the mitigation 
technique into the model of the damaged water system.  The resulting damaged and 
mitigated infrastructure models were used as inputs to multi-mode attack and failure 
simulations using the Model of Urban Fire Spread. 
Mitigation measures M01 through M06 were tested for all scenarios in Table 6.1; 
mitigation measure M07 was also tested against scenarios with water system damage in 
damage profiles E and F.  Thus, a total of 126 simulations were conducted in the 
mitigation analysis.  The consequences of each mitigated damage simulation were 
compared to the consequences of the original unmitigated damage simulation to 
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determine whether the mitigation measures were successful at reducing the 
consequences of the damage scenarios.  The performance of the various mitigation 
measures are presented and discussed in Section 7 of this dissertation. 
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7.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: MITIGATION MEASURES AND  
MULTI-MODE ATTACK AND FAILURE SIMULATIONS 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 The previous section introduced seven potential mitigation measures to decrease 
the effects on communities of multi-mode attacks and failures (MMAFs) involving 
urban fires with damage to at least one support infrastructure for fire response.  A 
methodology for testing the effectiveness of the mitigation measures was presented, and 
the results of the tests are presented here.  For convenience, Table 7.1 presents a 
descriptive summary table of the mitigation measures described in Section 6.2.  The 
following sections present a methodology for analyzing each mitigation method’s 
effectiveness and examples of each mitigation method’s performance against the MMAF 
scenarios presented in Sections 4 and 5. 
Table 7.1.  Summary of Mitigation Methods 
Mitigation 
Method Description 
M01 Replace all water mains with 12 inch ductile iron pipes 
M02 Replace 2 inch diameter water mains with 12 inch ductile iron 
pipes 
 
M03 Voluntary water conservation: reduce all water demands by half 
M04 Auxiliary elevated water storage tank 
M05 Additional fire trucks available through mutual aid contracts 
M06 Auxiliary water supply line and high-service pump 
M07 Bridge isolated pipe sections using temporary portable above-
ground water mains 
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7.2. Analysis of Mitigated MMAF Behavior 
The original proposal for this dissertation recommended calculating the 
consequences of an urban fire by totaling the population of the buildings completely or 
partially within the fire’s final burned area.  During the analysis of the mitigation results, 
however, it became apparent that examining the time distribution of the fire’s 
consequences could yield additional insight into the effectiveness of the mitigation 
measures.   
A mitigation measure might provide three possible benefits to emergency 
response.  The most obvious benefit is decreasing the overall consequences of the urban 
fire.  This effect is here named “Peak Consequence Reduction” (PCR) and is calculated 
as: 
 
pmpu CCPCR −=      (7.1) 
 
where Cpu refers to the peak (final) consequences of the unmitigated MMAF simulation 
and Cpm is the peak consequences of the mitigated MMAF simulation.  Both of these 
parameters are measured in units of displaced people.  PCR is shown graphically in 
Figure 7.1 on a graph of fire consequences vs. time for a mitigated and unmitigated 
urban fire simulation. 
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Fig. 7.1.  Graphical determination of Peak Consequences Reduction (PCR). 
 
Peak Consequence Reduction is important because it measures the population of 
buildings which are saved outright by the mitigation measure: in other words, a 
mitigation measure’s PCR is the number of people who do not lose their homes or 
businesses because of the urban fire, when they would have done so without the 
mitigation measure in place.  This parameter is the single most important measure of a 
mitigation method’s effectiveness, but it is not the only measure. 
The second parameter of interest in measuring mitigation effectiveness is 
“Average Consequence Delay” (ACD).  This parameter measures the average amount of 
time a mitigation measure delays fire event consequences.  This delay is averaged across 
all consequence levels reached by both unmitigated and mitigated fires.  (Thus, the 
average is taken up to the ultimate consequence level of the mitigated fire.)  This 
parameter is important because it represents additional evacuation time afforded by the 
mitigation measure.  For example, an unmitigated and mitigated simulation of a 
particular damage scenario might both reach a particular damage level – perhaps 2,000 
PCR
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displaced people – and burn approximately the same buildings.  Examining only their 
respective peak consequences level would yield the conclusion that the unmitigated and 
mitigated fires behaved similarly and that the mitigation measure had no effect.  
However, as can be seen in Figure 7.2a and 7.2b, the mitigated fire reaches various 
levels of damage at some time later than the unmitigated fire reaches these levels of 
damage.  Thus, the fire department would have extra time to evacuate people from 
endangered homes and businesses, which would likely decrease the loss of life and 
property resulting from the fire.  The average value of the delay in attaining all damage 
levels is used in order to account for delays throughout the firefighting process.  The 
average delay is calculated as: 
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where ACD is the Average Consequence Delay, the average amount of time the graph of 
mitigated damages lags behind the graph of unmitigated damages, in units of minutes;  t 
is time after the MMAF’s urban fire ignition in minutes; tpm is the time (in minutes after 
ignition) at which the mitigated MMAF simulation reaches its peak damage level; and 
Cu(t) and Cm(t) are the consequences of the urban fire at time t for the unmitigated and 
mitigated MMAF scenarios, respectively.  Thus, the integral which appears in the 
numerator of Equation 7.2 is simply the area between the damage vs. time curves for the 
unmitigated and mitigated case, measured between the MMAFs’ ignition time and the 
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time when the mitigated MMAF reaches its peak damage.  Dividing this area by the 
increase in unmitigated damages over the early-response period yields the average time 
lag between the graphs, which is the Average Consequence Delay. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.2a.  Key parameters in determining ACD in cases where peak consequences of unmitigated and 
mitigated damage simulations are the same.  The blue-shaded area between the curves is the area 
represented by the integral in the numerator of equation 7.2.  The difference in consequences at time = 0 
and the time at which the mitigated simulation reaches its peak is the denominator of Equation 7.2.  The 
area shaded in blue divided by the difference in starting and peak mitigated consquences is the Average 
Consequence Delay. 
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Fig. 7.2b.  Key parameters in determining ACD in cases where peak consequences of the mitigated 
damage simulations are lower than the unmitigated case.  Note that the area between the curves is 
calculated only up to the time when the mitigated damage simulation reaches its peak consequence level. 
 
 
 
The third parameter considered in this analysis is the difference in the amount of 
time it takes the fire department to bring the unmitigated and mitigated scenarios’ fires 
under control – that is, for the fires to reach their peak level of damages.  This parameter, 
named here “Expedited Control Time” (ECT), is calculated as: 
 
pmpu ttECT −=      (7.3) 
 
where tpu is the time after ignition (in minutes) the unmitigated MMAF simulation 
reaches its peak consequence level, and tpm is the time in minutes for the mitigated 
MMAF simulation to reach its peak consequence level.  ECT has a positive value when 
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the peak of the mitigated damage simulation occurs earlier than the peak of the 
unmitigated damage simulation.  By contrast, the value is negative when the peak of the 
mitigated damage simulation comes after the peak of the unmitigated damage scenario. 
 ECT is not sufficient to describe a mitigation measure’s effectiveness on its own, 
because additional information about the temporal distribution of fire consequences is 
needed to interpret the significance of the ECT value.  However, it does provide insight 
into the mitigation measure’s effect on the urban fire’s behavior.  If the ultimate 
consequences of the mitigated fire scenario are lower than the unmitigated 
consequences, a positive ECT value means that the fire department was able to achieve 
totally effective suppression in the mitigated scenario faster than in the unmitigated 
scenario.  Halting the fire’s progress earlier is a benefit to the community for two 
reasons: first, the spatial extent of the fire (and its resulting consequences) are lower than 
they would otherwise have been; and, second, the firefighters are freed from active 
suppression earlier, so they can turn their attention to search and rescue and emergency 
medical activities.  Although MUFS does not directly predict the casualty level from the 
urban fire, bringing the fire under control sooner and reassigning firefighters to other 
activities is likely to decrease the injuries and/or mortalities resulting from the fire.  
 Negative values for ECT (i.e., the peak of the mitigated scenario’s damage 
distribution occurs later than the unmitigated scenario’s peak) combined with a 
significant reduction of consequences from the unmitigated to the mitigated scenario are 
not necessarily a recommendation against the mitigation method under consideration.  
As was stated above, the reduction in peak consequences is the most important indicator 
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of a mitigation method’s suitability.  In this case, the negative value of ECT simply 
indicates a long period of partially-effective suppression that eventually ends in totally 
effective suppression; as a result, the firefighters will be engaged longer with the actual 
fire fighting than they would have been in the unmitigated case, but the fire suppression 
will be more successful than for the unmitigated case.  The value of ECT can be useful 
in making the choice between two mitigation alternatives which provide similar 
reduction in consequences, because the mitigation measure which brings the fire under 
control sooner is likely to have fewer casualties. 
 If the consequences of the mitigated urban fire are nearly or exactly the same as 
the unmitigated fire, however, a positive value of ECT means that the same damage 
happens for both fire scenarios but the burning is accelerated for the mitigated case.  
Clearly, this is not a desirable outcome for the mitigation measure.  In this case, a 
positive ECT value should be interpreted as a recommendation against the mitigation 
measure under consideration. 
 
7.3. Mitigated MMAF Simulation Results 
All of the mitigation measures were tested for twenty MMAF scenarios as 
described in Section 6.3, and the aggregate results of the mitigation testing are presented 
and discussed here.  A complete presentation of the mitigation results’ performance is 
included in Appendix A2. 
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7.3.1. Mitigation Method M01: Performance and Discussion 
 In general, mitigation method M01 was the most effective of all the mitigation 
measures tested.  A representative example of the method’s performance for MMAF 
damage scenario F02 is shown in Figure 7.2, with the results of the mitigated damage 
simulation compared to scenario F02’s unmitigated results.  For both the unmitigated 
and mitigated simulations, the wind is blowing to the northwest at 10 mph and the urban 
fire starts at the ignition points specified by the ECO target profile.  It is clear from the 
graph that mitigation method M01 is highly successful by all three effectiveness metrics; 
this case is generally representative of the mitigation measure’s performance with other 
MMAF damage scenarios.  In the case shown in Figure 7.3, the mitigation measure 
reduces the consequences of the original MMAF scenario by 4,382 displaced people (a 
reduction of 87% from the original damage level).  The ACD for the mitigation measure 
is about 160 minutes, and the ECT for mitigated damage scenario F02M01 is 240 
minutes.  (The six-character notation used to describe the mitigated infrastructure 
damage simulations combines the three-character infrastructure damage scenario 
notation – in this case, infrastructure damage scenario F02 – with the three-character 
notation for the mitigation measure – for this example, M01.)  
The choice to upgrade all the water mains in the water distribution system has a 
large benefit for this damage scenario: it saves the homes and businesses of 4,382 
people, gives the fire fighters an extra 160 minutes to evacuate the homes and businesses 
which are still destroyed by the fire, and allows the fire department to stop fighting fires 
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and focus on search and rescue and emergency medical help four hours sooner than in 
the unmitigated damage scenario. 
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Fig. 7.3.  Example of performance of mitigation method M01.  The unmitigated damage simulation (blue 
graph) used water damage scenario F02, with wind blowing to the northwest at 10 mph and the 
ecoterrorism target profile (ECO). 
  
As seen in Table 7.2 and Figure 7.3, this mitigation measure is highly effective at 
reducing the consequences of a variety of MMAF scenarios.  The major disadvantage to 
this mitigation measure is its cost of implementation.  As discussed in Section 6.2.1, this 
mitigation measure involves replacing about 38,000 feet of pipe at a cost of $1.8 million.  
The effort and expense involved may not be feasible for all community water systems.  
This potential cost hurdle is the reason mitigation method M02 was examined as a 
special case, in order to investigate the effectiveness of replacing only a subset of the 
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system’s mains (at a fraction of the cost of method M01).  The performance of this 
strategy is discussed in section 7.3.2. 
 
7.3.2. Mitigation Method M02: Performance and Discussion 
 Mitigation method M02, which involves the replacement of all 2-inch diameter 
mains with 12-inch ductile iron pipes, performed nearly as well as mitigation method 
M01 in many cases.  A representative example of the measure’s effect on MMAF 
damage scenario A03 is shown in Figure 7.4.  For the example shown, the wind is 
blowing into the southwest at 10 mph and the urban fire starts at the GOV target profile.  
In this example, the mitigation method’s PCR is 2,243 displaced people.  The average 
additional evacuation time, as measured by the mitigation method’s ACD, is about 245 
minutes.  The peak of the mitigated damage vs. time graph occurs later than the peak of 
the unmitigated graph, so the ECT value is -120 minutes (i.e. the firefighters are engaged 
in fighting the fire for two hours longer in the mitigated case than the unmitigated case).  
As discussed in Section 7.2, however, a negative ECT value is not a recommendation 
against a mitigation strategy in cases like this one where the final consequences of the 
mitigated MMAF simulation are significantly lower than the consequences of the 
unmitigated simulation. 
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Fig. 7.4.  Example of performance of mitigation method M02.  Unmitigated damage simulation (blue 
line) used water damage scenario A03, with wind blowing southwest at 10 mph and the government 
buildings target profile. 
 
 
7.3.3. Mitigation Method M03: Performance and Discussion 
 As discussed in section 6.2.3, mitigation method M03 tests the effect of limiting 
base-level water demands using voluntary water conservation during fire fighting 
operations.  This mitigation method’s performance was inconsistent; it was very 
effective in some cases and had very little impact in others.  Figure 7,5 shows the 
unmitigated and mitigated consequences over time for the MMAF scenario involving 
infrastructure damage scenario F04 with an urban fire starting at the GOV ignition point 
profile and prevailing wind blowing to the northeast at 10 mph: a scenario for which the 
mitigation method performed well.  
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Fig. 7.5.  Example of performance of mitigation method M03.  Unmitigated damage simulation (blue 
line) used water damage scenario BH2, with wind blowing northeast at 10 mph and the government 
buildings target profile. 
 
In the damage and mitigation results shown above, the PCR produced by mitigation 
measure M03 is 1,472 displaced people.  Additional evacuation time yielded by the 
mitigation measure, as represented by the mitigation measure’s ACD, is about 60 
minutes.  With the reduced demands in place, the fire department was able to bring the 
fire under control two hours sooner than in the unmitigated case (ECT value of 120 
minutes).   
 The mitigation measure did not provide consistent benefits for all the damage 
scenarios against which it was evaluated.  It is notable, however, that this mitigation 
method, which has no direct costs of implementation, produced significant benefits in 
some cases.  Although this mitigation measure is not recommended as the only action in 
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an MMAF mitigation strategy, it is worth considering in conjunction with other 
mitigation measures. 
 
7.3.4. Mitigation Method M04: Performance and Discussion 
 The effect of adding an auxiliary elevated storage tank is examined in the 
mitigated damage simulations using mitigation method M04.  Figure 7.6 shows an 
example of the consequences over time for this mitigation measure, compared to the 
corresponding unmitigated damage simulation.  Both unmitigated and mitigated 
scenarios involved an MMAF scenario with infrastructure damage scenario BH2 and the 
ECO urban fire ignition point profile, with prevailing winds blowing 10 mph into the 
southeast.   In the figure below, the peak consequence reduction produced by the 
mitigation method was 4,200 displaced people.   The mitigation technique provided 
about 150 minutes of additional evacuation time, as shown by the technique’s ACD 
value.  The mitigated fire came under total control about 30 minutes later than the 
unmitigated fire, but as stated earlier this is not a recommendation against the mitigation 
method because of the considerable reduction in overall consequences for the fire.    
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Fig. 7.6.  Example of performance of mitigation method M04.  Unmitigated damage simulation (blue 
line) used water damage scenario BH2, with wind blowing southeast at 10 mph and the ecoterrorism 
buildings target profile. 
 
 
 
Mitigation strategy M04 was highly effective when employed against an urban 
fire starting from the ecoterrorism (ECO) target profile, and the benefits to fire 
suppression for this target profile were noted across a wide range of infrastructure 
damage scenarios and wind directions.  This effect is probably due mainly to the location 
of the auxiliary water storage tank on the east side of town, close to the ignition points in 
the ecoterrorism target group.  The mitigation measure was also very effective in 
scenarios which directly threatened buildings on the eastern side of town: for example, 
scenarios originating from targets in the Central Business District with wind directions 
45 or 315.  The mitigation measure was markedly less effective in improving fire 
suppression for scenarios which did not originate in or directly threaten the eastern side 
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of town, which suggests that the effects of the effect of the auxiliary stoage tank were 
highly localized.  Modifying this mitigation method to provide the benefit to the entire 
urban area might require the construction of several auxiliary storage tanks, which would 
greatly increase the cost of implementing the mitigation measure. 
 The observation that, in many of the ecoterrorism damage scenarios, installing 
the auxiliary water storage tank is approximately as effective as mitigation measure M01 
suggests that the limiting factor in effective fire response to this target profile may be the 
difficulty in getting water at sufficient pressure for firefighting in the area surrounding 
the ignition points.  As discussed in Section 6.2.4, the pressure loss is caused by the fact 
that this area of town is hydraulically distant from the high-service pumps, and the water 
must pass through small-diameter pipes to reach the area.  Mitigation measures which 
reduce energy loss caused by friction (such as M01 and M02) or provide an alternate 
water supply for the area (such as M04 and M06) were generally highly successful.   
 
7.3.5. Mitigation Method M05: Performance and Discussion 
 Mitigation method M05 takes a different approach from the techniques examined 
in previous sections.  While many of the mitigation techniques evaluated in this project 
mitigate MMAF damage by making more water available for firefighting, this technique 
augments firefighting ability by making more fire trucks available through mutual aid 
contracts.  This technique was added to the group of possible mitigation strategies in 
order to determine the extent to which lack of available fire trucks is the limiting factor 
in effective MMAF fire suppression. 
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 In most cases, mitigation technique M05 had little or no effect on the MMAF 
scenario’s final consequences, but the availability of additional trucks and fire fighters 
did provide a small amount of extra time (usually about 30 minutes) for evacuation of 
the affected buildings.  An example of this type of effect is shown in Figure 7.7.  For 
both simulations in the figure, the infrastructure damage scenario is D01, the urban fire 
starts at the POP ignition point profile, and the wind is blowing 10 mph into the 
southeast. 
 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
Time (minutes)
D
is
pl
ac
ed
 P
eo
pl
e
D01
D01M05
 
Fig. 7.7.  Example of performance of mitigation method M05 with low effectiveness.  Unmitigated 
damage simulation (blue line) used water damage scenario D01, with wind blowing southeast at 10 mph 
and the high-population buildings target profile. 
 
 In the example shown above, the reduction in ultimate consequences is 0 
displaced people.  The only benefit afforded by the additional firefighters was an ACD 
of 31.3 minutes.  The firefighters were actively engaged in fighting the fire for 60 
minutes longer in the mitigated case than in the unmitigated case.  Although some 
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benefit is derived from the half hour of additional evacuation time, the above scenario 
(and the other scenarios with similar results for this mitigation measure) did not receive 
a significant benefit from the additional firefighting resources.  For these scenarios, it is 
clear that the number of fire trucks available was not the limiting factor in successful fire 
suppression, so making more fire trucks available produced no substantial effect. 
 In other cases, however, the addition of extra fire trucks had a significant effect 
on MMAF consequences.  This effect was observed most frequently in MMAF scenarios 
originating at the government building target profile.  An example of this type of effect 
is shown in Figure 7.8 (infrastructure damage scenario E02, wind 10 mph to the south). 
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Fig. 7.8.  Example of performance of mitigation method M05 with high effectiveness.  Both damage 
damage simulations (used water damage scenario E02, with wind blowing southward at 10 mph and the 
government buildings target profile. 
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 In the MMAF scenario shown above, assigning additional fire trucks to the fire 
response effort decreases the ultimate consequences of the urban fire by 1,496 displaced 
people.  In addition, the mitigation effort provides substantial extra evacuation time, with 
an ACD value of about 125 minutes.  The ECT value of the mitigated damage vs. time 
graph is -60 minutes. 
 The success of this method in scenarios involving the government target profiles 
implies that, for these scenarios, the limiting factor in effective fire response was the 
number of fire trucks available, not the amount of water for firefighting.  The 
government buildings used as ignition points in these scenarios are comparatively tightly 
clustered in the central business district; other target profiles are spread more widely 
throughout the urban area.  The tight clustering would permit the fire department to form 
a perimeter around the burned area more effectively than the widespread targets, so 
additional fire trucks would be more likely to have a measurable effect on reinforcing 
the perimeter.   
 As with mitigation measure M03, this mitigation measure has no direct cost of 
implementation (although it may ultimately have some associated costs, as the fire 
department will be called out more frequently to assist with fires in other communities 
due to the more extensive mutual aid contracts).  Although it is not effective in all 
situations and probably should not be the only technique in this community’s mitigation 
strategy, it produced significant benefits in some of the MMAF scenarios and is worth 
considering as a backup mitigation measure. 
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7.3.6. Mitigation Method M06: Performance and Discussion 
The technique of augmenting the water supply for firefighting by installing an 
auxiliary water supply line to the east side of the urban area was effective for many of 
the MMAF scenarios.  This method produced the most consistent benefits for fire 
scenarios beginning at the ecoterrorism targets, which is not surprising since the 
buildings most directly threatened by these targets are close to the auxiliary supply 
pipeline’s outflow to the water distribution system.  This mitigation method also 
performed well across a variety of urban fire ignition point profiles for infrastructure 
damage scenarios like A01 and D01 which severely limited the supply of water for 
firefighting, and for infrastructure damage scenario F01, which introduced a blockage in 
a high-conveyance section of the water distribution system.  (In this scenario, the 
auxiliary supply line functioned as a low-friction alternate path for water bound to the 
eastern side of the urban area.)  An example of the consequences over time for a 
successful application of this mitigation method is shown in Figure 7.9.  For the 
unmitigated and mitigated damage simulations shown, the model used infrastructure 
damage scenario A01 with an urban fire starting at the ECO target profile and the 
prevailing wind blowing 10 mph towards the southeast.  In this case, the auxiliary water 
supply line reduced the overall consequences of the urban fire by 4,118 people.  This 
mitigation method allowed an average consequence delay of about 70 minutes and 
brought the urban fire under control 210 minutes faster than the unmitigated MMAF 
scenario.  
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Fig. 7.9.  Example of performance of mitigation method M06.  Unmitigated damage simulation (blue 
line) used water damage scenario A01, with wind blowing southeast at 10 mph and the ecoterrorism target 
profile. 
 
 In a few MMAF scenarios, however, the auxiliary supply line did not have a 
significant effect on the urban fire’s consequence.  One vulnerability of the auxiliary 
water supply pump and pipeline is that its water source is the same water treatment plant 
as the primary high service pumps.  Flow into the water treatment plant is driven by a 
grouping of smaller pumps from the local reservoir and wellfield.  These pumps are on 
the same electrical power circuit as the primary high-service pumps, so the infrastructure 
damage scenarios B01, B02, and B03, which cut power to all of these pumps, cut off the 
supply of water to the auxiliary pipeline.  Thus, this mitigation method was not 
successful in reducing the impact of any of the power-outage infrastructure damage 
scenarios, although it probably would have been successful in these cases if the auxiliary 
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supply line were coupled with backup power supplies for the pumps which supply raw 
water to the water treatment plant.  This mitigation measure was also mostly ineffective 
when employed against MMAF scenario G01, which involves a 30-minute delay before 
the water system is accessed for firefighting.  (Few water-infrastructure mitigation 
methods were effective against this damage scenario.) 
 
7.3.7. Mitigation Method M07: Performance and Discussion 
The damage simulations involving mitigation method M07 tested the 
effectiveness of bridging blocked areas of the water distribution system with temporary, 
portable, above-ground water mains.  The damage simulations were designed to use 
pipes with the properties of sections of 10-inch fire hose connected between fire 
hydrants, since these are easy access points to the water system and readily available 
improvised pipelines.  This mitigation measure was tested for damage categories E and 
F, which dealt with water main breaches and self-imposed isolations of sections of the 
water distribution system to contain localized drinking water contaminations. 
This mitigation measure generally was not successful; in most of the damage 
scenarios for which it was tested, it had no effect at all on the distribution of urban fire 
consequences over time.   Figure 7.10 shows an example of a damage scenario in which 
this mitigation method did have a small beneficial effect on the mitigated damage 
simulation.  In this case, the mitigation method did not reduce the overall consequences 
of the MMAF, it did lag the damage-vs.-time curve behind the unmitigated simulation 
results by about half an hour.  The ACD for this case was just under 35 minutes; the 
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ECT was -30 minutes.  The simulations shown use the infrastructure damage profile F02 
and ECO urban fire target profile, with the prevailing wind blowing 10 mph into the 
northwest. 
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Fig. 7.10.  Example of performance of mitigation method M07.  Unmitigated and mitigated damage 
simulations use water damage scenario F02, with wind blowing northwest at 10 mph and the ecoterrorism 
target profile. 
 
 The main reason for this mitigation method’s failure is probably the severe 
energy loss induced by the mechanical linkages required to connect the temporary 
mains.  This type of energy loss, known in fluid mechanics as minor loss, occurs when 
the water in the pipes makes sudden changes in direction and when the pipes used to 
convey the water have abrupt changes in diameter.  The path taken by water flowing 
through the temporary mains requires at least six 90-degree bends and four abrupt 
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changes of pipe diameter (from water main to hydrant connection pipe to temporary 
pipeline, and then the same transitions occur again in reverse).  Furthermore, the 
magnitude of the energy loss is proportional to the square of the velocity in the pipes; 
flow velocities are especially high under fire fighting conditions because of the large 
required flows.  The proportionality constant used for each pipe in the minor loss 
calculations was 2.0, which is consistent with the mechanical fittings present but creates 
a large loss of energy due to friction with the fittings.  The energy loss causes a decrease 
in pressure for the water flowing through the pipes, which decreases the amount of water 
available at firefighting pressures when the water reaches its destination.   
 Although this particular test of temporary portable water mains was not 
successful, further investigation of this technique as a potential mitigation measure is 
warranted.  The failure of this technique can inform the design of future temporary main 
configurations.  In order to minimize the energy loss due to friction, the pipes used 
should have very smooth interior walls.  It would be difficult to eliminate the minor 
losses caused by hydrant fittings, but one way to overcome the energy loss would be to 
introduce a small booster pump into the temporary water main system in order to add the 
lost energy back into the system.  It may be very difficult for fire departments engaged in 
fighting large-scale urban fires to spare a pumper truck for every temporary water main, 
but this variety of fire truck could be a solution to the problem of the excessive energy 
loss.  These trucks are highly portable, have connections for fire hose-sized pipes already 
in place, and have appropriately-sized pump equipment on board.  Communities which 
do not find fire hoses sufficient on their own as portable water mains may evaluate the 
  
149
effect of using pumper trucks or other portable pumping equipment to improve the water 
flow through the temporary pipeline system. 
 
7.4. Mitigation Methods and Worst-Case Damage Scenario 
 The final test of the mitigation methods was against the worst-case damage 
MMAF scenario determined by the total enumeration optimization in Section 5.5.  
Figure 7.11 shows the performance of the various mitigation methods against this 
ignition point arrangement.  For these simulations, the prevailing wind is blowing 
eastward at 10 mph. 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
Time (minutes)
D
is
pl
ac
ed
 P
eo
pl
e
D01
D01M01
D01M02
D01M03
D01M04
D01M05
D01M06
 
Fig. 7.11.  Performance of mitigation measures against optimized worst-case arrangement of urban fire 
ignition points.  The unmitigated damage distribution (black line) is not readily visible because it is nearly 
identical to (and plotted underneath) the orange line for the consequence distribution of mitigation 
measure M02.  The MMAF simulations reported here used infrastructure damage profile D01, and the 
prevailing wind was eastward at 10 mph. 
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As stated in Section 5.5, this ignition point arrangement was paired with infrastructure 
damage scenario D01.   The predetermined infrastructure damage scenario had an impact 
on the mitigation methods which were most effective against the urban fire.  Because 
this infrastructure damage scenario removes access to the city’s elevated storage tank, it 
is perhaps not surprising that mitigation method M06, which replaces half of the lost 
storage capacity, yields the greatest reduction in consequences.  Mitigation methods 
M01 and M04 were also successful at reducing and delaying the consequences, which 
affords substantial extra evacuation time for the homes and businesses destroyed by the 
fire.  Mitigation methods M02, M03, and M05 had very little effect on the urban fire’s 
progress. 
 
7.5 Overall Mitigation Results 
Although the mitigation measures performed differently in various MMAF 
scenarios, it is useful to examine the techniques’ average results in order to gain insight 
into their overall effectiveness.  Table 7.2 lists the mitigation measures’ average (over all 
mitigated damage simulations which involved the mitigation measure) PCR, ACD, and 
ECT values, along with their cost of implementation. 
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Table 7.2.  Average Effectiveness and Implementation Costs of Mitigation Measures 
Mitigation 
Method 
PCR 
(Displaced 
People) 
ACD 
(min) 
ECT 
(min) 
Estimated 
Cost 
PCR Unit 
Cost 
M01 1751 96 51 $1,800,000 $1,027.81
M02 1436 110 -12 $200,000 $139.24
M03 550 45 -6 $50,000 $90.91
M04 1439 99 -2 $475,000 $330.15
M05 184 34 -51 $0 $0.00
M06 1049 76 38 $240,000 $228.87
M07 0 5 -5 $0 N/A
 
 Mitigation method M01 is the most effective, but it is also the most expensive by 
a substantial margin.  Even when the total cost of the mitigation measure is divided by 
the measure’s PCR to give the unit cost of saving each person’s home or business, 
method M01 is more than three times as expensive as the next most costly alternative.  
Method M02 provides the best combination of low cost and high effectiveness; methods 
M04 and M06 also provide good results at moderate cost.  Methods M03, M05, and M07 
have no (or very low) implementation cost but lower average benefits; this suggests that 
they may be helpful in defending the community against MMAFs but probably should 
not be the community’s only mitigation strategy. 
 Expressing the mitigation methods’ implementation cost in terms of unit cost per 
consequence reduction is not the only possible way to evaluate the tradeoff between cost 
and effectiveness; it is simply the most straightforward method.   The extra evacuation 
time and earlier fire control times afforded by the mitigation methods allow the fire 
fighters to be more effective in their rescue and evacuation duties.  This added 
effectiveness could also be accomplished by having additional rescue workers at the 
scene; in other words, a team can accomplish more either by having more time to work 
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(because of the mitigation methods’ consequence delay and expedited control times) or 
more people to work (by hiring extra rescue workers).  Future research may develop an 
equivalency scale between the extra time that the mitigation methods afford and the 
equivalent number of rescue workers this saves.  This would allow decision-makers to 
assign a monetary benefit – the cost of hiring the equivalent number of additional rescue 
workers for the unmitigated MMAF – to counter the cost of the mitigation method.  
Further investigation of this relationship is necessary to make this approach a reliable 
input to decision-making, but it would yield a better understanding of the mitigation 
methods’ benefits. 
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8.  CONCLUSION 
 
8.1. Summary of Work Presented 
 This dissertation has discussed the importance of considering communities’ 
vulnerability to multi-mode attacks and failures (MMAFs).  An important primary step 
in creating security strategies which take interdependent infrastructures into account is 
developing the capability to model the interaction of interdependent infrastructures in 
MMAF scenarios.  The Model of Urban Fire Spread (MUFS) is presented as a tool to 
simulate complex infrastructure interactions during a joint water infrastructure 
failure/urban fire event.   
 Using the MUFS simulation tool, an extensive vulnerability analysis of 
“Micropolis,” an example community, was performed using a wide range of 
infrastructure damage scenarios and urban fire ignition profiles to provide insight into 
the range of damages this type of MMAF could produce.  In addition, the worst-case 
arrangement of urban fire ignition points was determined using an enumeration 
optimization algorithm.  Two other optimization algorithms were evaluated for this 
application but were determined to be inappropriate. 
Analysis of the results of the simulations identified the most serious MMAF 
scenarios, including the highest-consequence modes of infrastructure failure.  Seven 
potential mitigation strategies were designed to counter these modes of failure and 
reduce the consequences of the MMAF scenarios by improving the water systems’ 
ability to provide water for fire fighting even under heavy damage.  These mitigation 
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measures were tested against the highest-consequence MMAF scenarios using the 
MUFS simulation tool.  The results of these mitigated MMAF simulations identified the 
most effective mitigation strategy for each infrastructure damage scenario and overall.  
Effectiveness of a mitigation strategy was evaluated using three criteria: overall 
reduction of the number of people displaced by the urban fire; additional evacuation time 
afforded by the mitigation measure’s delay of fire consequences; and expedited control 
of the urban fire.  The effectiveness of each mitigation method was compared to its cost 
of implementation to determine the best overall strategy.  Mitigation method M01, 
which involved the replacement of most of the city’s water mains with larger, more 
modern pipes, was found to be the most effective strategy, but its cost of implementation 
was very high.  Mitigation method M02, which called for the replacement of a small 
subset of the city’s water mains, was found to be the best balance between 
implementation cost and effectiveness of the mitigation measures tested. 
  
8.2. Future Work: Model of Urban Fire Spread 
 Following the Hamada equations and the approach of the Fire Following 
Earthquake model in HAZUS-MH, MUFS approximates urban fire growth by 
calculating the fire’s progress along four directions.  During the course of developing 
MUFS, however, it was hypothesized that, during an actual urban fire, each fire front 
point would behave as a new ignition point, itself engendering fire spread in each of the 
three open fire spread directions (the fourth direction, from which the new ignition point 
came, is not available for fire spread because it has already been burned).  This fractal-
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like approach is illustrated in Figure 8.1.  Although the number of front points needed to 
define the burned area polygon would grow exponentially at each time step and quickly 
become unmanageable, an approximation of the fractal fire growth process could 
probably be developed which would preserve the realism of the fractal fire growth 
pattern while limiting the number of burned area perimeter points to a computationally 
feasible value. 
 
#
 
Fig. 8.1.  Schematic diagram of process for calculating fire spread under the fractal fire spread model.  
The large red circle denotes the fire’s ignition point.  Orange points are the burn perimeter points at the 
end of the first time step, and the orange dotted line shows the burned area perimeter at this time step.  For 
the next time step, each of the orange points is treated as a new ignition point, so fire spread is calculated 
in each feasible direction (neglecting directions which have already been burned).  The green points show 
the burn perimeter points at the end of the second time step; note that there are twelve burn perimeter 
points in the second time step instead of just four.   
 
 One important benefit of this new approach to calculating the extent of the 
burned area is that it would minimize the occurrence of geometrical inaccuracies in fire 
extent, particularly in small or sparsely-developed urban areas.  Currently, MUFS 
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determines the extent of the urban area by searching for intersections between the fire 
spread vectors and the buildings in the urban area.  In any particular direction, the end of 
the urban area is defined as the fire spread vector’s exit point from the building furthest 
from the ignition point.  This building may not actually be at the edge of the urban area, 
but if no other buildings lie directly in the fire’s path then the fire’s spread will stop at 
that building, even if totally effective suppression is not achieved.  This can lead MUFS 
to underestimate the extent of fires in small or low-density urban areas, where the odds 
of a fire spread vector ending prematurely are increased (because there are fewer 
buildings for the vector to intersect). 
 With the fractal fire spread growth pattern, the importance of premature 
terminations of fire spread in any one direction would decrease, because even if one fire 
spread front ended prematurely, the other nearby front points would compensate by 
spreading through the area that was inaccurately removed from burning. 
 A disadvantage to this approach is that it would complicate the process of 
determining fire spread extent, particularly the suppressed fire spread calculations 
(which are currently responsible for the majority of the computational requirements of 
the simulation).  Future efforts to refine the simulation algorithms may make them more 
efficient, which would lessen the impact of the added complexity imposed by the fractal 
fire spread approach. 
 Another proposed change to the Model of Urban Fire Spread would improve the 
realism of how it calculates fire suppression in the early stages of the urban fire.  MUFS 
treats fire spread separately in each of the four fire spread directions, so if a large fire is 
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totally suppressed in one direction it can continue to spread in other directions until the 
fire is brought under totally effective suppression in all four fire spread directions.  The 
effectiveness of the fire suppression is calculated by assigning each building to its 
closest fire spread direction.  Each building can only be assigned to one fire spread 
direction.  This approach is realistic for urban fires which are large compared to the 
buildings they burn, because the buildings can be approximated as points which are 
definitely closest to one single fire spread direction.  During the analysis of the urban 
fires’ burn profiles, however, it was noticed that this approach may not be appropriate  
for urban fires which are not large compared to the surrounding buildings – that is, fires 
early in their development.  Buildings being burned by small fires are still only assigned 
to a single fire spread direction, even though the fire may be burning those buildings on 
multiple fronts.  Likewise, the benefits of the resources designated for fighting the fire in 
that building are assigned only to one fire spread direction, which may under-represent 
the effectiveness of fire suppression in the fire’s earliest stages.  The planned solution for 
this issue is to define some threshold time or stage of development before which the 
fire’s burning buildings, and their accompanying fire suppression activities, may be 
assigned to as many fire spread directions as are appropriate.  After this threshold time 
or development stage, fire suppression will follow the current approach of determining 
only one nearest fire spread direction. 
 This approach raises the question of when this threshold time or development 
stage should occur.  The simplest answer is that a fire which has entered more than one 
building should transition from a “small” to a “large” fire; however, because the fire 
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front moves at different speeds in each direction, one direction’s fire front could enter a 
new building a few time steps before the others leave the building of origin.  Adopting 
this simple threshold may reintroduce the inaccuracy the approach was designed to 
avoid.  The effects of several different approaches to defining the transition from small 
fire to large fire will be examined, and the most realistic option will be adopted. 
 Evaluating the overall realism of the urban fire spread simulations in MUFS is 
the subject of a third topic for future investigation.  Although the fire spread equations 
adopted by MUFS were based on decades of empirical data on historical urban fires, it is 
desirable to compare the model’s simulation results with the burned area of historical 
fires in which firefighting was compromised – for example, the second great London 
Fire (Johnson 1980) or the San Francisco fire of 1906 (Nolte 2006) -- to further validate 
the model of complex infrastructure interactions.  The main challenge of this task is the 
difficulty of finding sufficiently detailed information about the historical MMAF events, 
particularly burned area profiles over time.  The search for information on historical 
MMAF events will continue in the future and will inform future efforts to validate the 
model’s performance. 
 MUFS’s current focus is on the interaction between water distribution systems 
and fire response, although the simulation tool can indirectly model the effects of 
failures of the electrical grid, communications systems, and transportation networks.  
Future work will seek to incorporate more sophisticated models of other interdependent 
infrastructures: for example, MUFS might benefit from an analysis of transportation 
delays derived from a dynamic transportation network model, instead of using a static, 
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user-specified delay to represent traffic delays.  In addition, more information on fire 
response’s relationship with the public health system (another critical infrastructure) 
may provide better insight into the injuries and mortalities resulting from MMAF 
scenarios.  In its current form MUFS cannot predict the casualties resulting from an 
MMAF scenario, but this is nevertheless an important consideration in planning 
emergency mitigation and response strategies.  Integrating additional infrastructure 
models will make MUFS a more complete MMAF model and a better decision support 
tool. 
MUFS will be made freely available to other researchers and to water utilities 
and to emergency planners who wish to use the MMAF simulation tool to conduct their 
own vulnerability analyses.   
 
8.3. Future Work: MMAF Vulnerability and Mitigation Analysis 
This project tested the viability of using dynamic programming to determine the 
highest-consequence arrangement of urban fire ignition points.  Although dynamic 
programming was not appropriate for this application for the reasons discussed in 
Section 5.4, determining the worst-case MMAF scenario is still an important component 
of the vulnerability assessment and mitigation design process.  The enumeration-based 
optimization method provided the worst-case configuration of ignition points, but this 
technique is extremely computationally expensive, and a more efficient technique would 
be a great benefit to future vulnerability analyses. 
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To this end, future research efforts will investigate the possibility of using other 
optimization methods to determine worst-case MMAF scenarios.  Genetic algorithms 
seem particularly well-suited to this task, and the investigation will most likely begin 
with this technique. 
Understanding of the risks facing water utilities and the available mitigation 
strategies is constantly evolving, and the methodology for assessing these risks and 
choosing the best mitigation strategies will continue to evolve as well.  The methodology 
presented in this dissertation is intended to be flexible, able to adapt to the needs of 
individual water systems and to new threat information as it arises, and it is hoped that it 
will continue to provide benefit to water distribution systems’ security in the future.
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Derivation of Fire Hydrant Emitter Coefficient 
 
 Section 3.5.2 of this dissertation presents a methodology for determining 
available fire flow at a pressure of 20 psi, the minimum water pressure required for 
effective fire suppression.  If the Model of Urban Fire Spread (MUFS) is unable to 
obtain the full fire flow of 1000 gpm from a fire hydrant, it determines the available flow 
at the minimum pressure by converting the hydrant node to an “emitter,” which models 
uncontrolled flow to the environment through an open orifice, with an emitter coefficient 
of 1850 gpm/psi1/2.  The derivation of this value is presented here.  
The discharge through an orifice flow depends on the size of the orifice (which is 
here assumed to be the 10-inch diameter outflow of a fire hydrant) and the pressure 
immediately upstream of the orifice.  This relationship is expressed: 
 
gHACQ d 2
2/1⋅⋅=      (A1.1) 
  
where Q is the flow through the orifice in cubic feet per second (cfs), A is the cross-
sectional area of the orifice in square feet, H is the head equivalent (in feet) of the 
pressure at the orifice, and g is the gravitational acceleration, 32.2 ft/sec2.  The discharge 
coefficient Cd has a value of 0.62 (unitless) for a sharp-edged orifice. 
 The emitter equation used by EPANet is an adaptation of the orifice discharge 
equation (Rossman 2000): 
 
2/1pCQ ⋅=       (A1.2) 
 
where C is the “emitter coefficient,” a required user input to the hydraulic model, and p 
is the pressure in pounds per square inch (psi), which is physically the same as H head 
above the orifice.  C can be determined by setting the right-hand sides of Equations A1.1 
and A1.2 equal to each other and rearranging the terms to give: 
 
g
p
HACC d 2
2/1
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛⋅⋅=     (A1.3) 
 
Solving equation A1.3 using values of 0.62 for Cd, 0.55 ft2 for the area of a 10-inch 
circular orifice, and the standard value (for water) of 1 ft head per 0.433  psi of pressure 
yields a value of 4.124 ft3/sec/psi1/2 or 1850 gpm/psi1/2, the value used for C in this 
analysis. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Notes on Appendix 2 
This section presents the results of the simulations of multi-mode attack and 
failure (MMAF) urban fires under various infrastructure damage profiles with mitigation 
measures in use.  Pages 145-147 contain a summary table of the results of 126 separate 
simulations which tested the seven mitigation measures discussed in Section 6 against 20 
different combinations of urban fire ignition point distribution, wind direction, and 
infrastructure damage scenario. 
Each simulation’s results are quantified using three novel analysis metrics 
introduced in section 7.2 of this dissertation.  Peak Consequences Reduction (PCR) 
measures the reduction (from the unmitigated MMAF simulation to the mitigated case) 
in the number of people who are displaced by the urban fire.  Average Consequence 
Delay (ACD) is the extra evacuation time (in minutes) afforded by the mitigation 
measure.  Expedited Control Time (ECT) is a measure of how much sooner (in minutes) 
the fire department is able to bring the mitigated urban fire under total control (as 
compared to the unmitigated damage simulation with the same target/wind 
direction/infrastructure damage profile).   
The graphs presented on pages 148-157 show the development over time of the 
consequences of MMAF urban fires with various mitigation measures in place.  
Consequences were calculated at time steps of 5 minutes for the entire duration of the 
damage simulation.  For clarity, individual data point markers are omitted.  In some of 
the figures, the unmitigated damage scenario graphs (black lines) are covered by the 
graphs of mitigation measures which did not have a significant effect on the simulation 
results. 
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Table A2.1.  Results of Mitigated MMAF Simulations 
Damage 
Scenario/ 
Mitigation  
Measure 
Peak 
Damages 
(Displaced 
Persons) 
PCR 
(Displaced 
Persons) 
ACD 
(min) 
ECT 
(min) 
A01M01 2023 3046 148.7 -30 
A02M01 1198 3839 471.4 -210 
A03M01 1178 2243 247.3 -120 
AD1M01 4164 16 6.9 0 
B01M01 486 4583 33.9 510 
B02M01 3212 618 41.6 90 
BH1M01 3500 994 66.4 0 
BH2M01 862 4200 113.8 120 
D01M01 3145 1033 67.6 120 
D01M01 4975 25 42.7 -60 
D02M01 4164 2 3.2 -30 
E01M01 3537 691 99.4 -30 
E02M01 3801 27 -3.0 -30 
E03M01 3537 691 99.3 -30 
F02M01 653 4384 158.4 240 
F03M01 486 4555 34.1 510 
F04M01 2967 458 84.4 -60 
F05M01 3145 225 77.6 -90 
G01M01 1721 3316 100.7 120 
H01M01 4364 80 29.1 0 
A01M02 2023 3046 145.8 -30 
A02M02 1198 3839 416.3 -150 
A03M02 1178 2243 247.3 -120 
AD1M02 4164 16 6.9 0 
B01M02 486 4583 33.9 510 
B02M02 3212 618 33.8 120 
BH1M02 3434 1060 73.8 0 
BH2M02 1628 3434 150.8 -30 
D01M02 4178 0 0.7 0 
D01M02 5000 0 0.0 0 
D02M02 4164 2 1.7 0 
E01M02 3534 694 100.7 -30 
E02M02 3801 27 -8.0 -30 
E03M02 3537 691 99.4 -30 
F02M02 1352 3685 380.7 -120 
F03M02 1015 4026 311.9 -180 
F04M02 2967 458 85.8 -60 
F05M02 3145 225 63.1 -60 
G01M02 5037 0 31.9 -30 
H01M02 4364 80 26.3 0 
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Table A2.1 (continued).  Results of Mitigated MMAF Simulations 
Damage 
Scenario/ 
Mitigation 
Measure 
Peak 
Damages 
(Displaced 
Persons) 
PCR 
(Displaced 
Persons) 
ACD 
(min) 
ECT 
(min) 
A01M03 5005 64 30.6 -30 
A02M03 2465 2572 208.4 0 
A03M03 3421 0 0.0 0 
AD1M03 4166 14 2.5 0 
B01M03 5041 28 25.2 0 
B02M03 3830 0 1.0 0 
BH1M03 4494 0 0.0 0 
BH2M03 5005 57 29.7 -30 
D01M03 4178 0 0.1 0 
D01M03 5000 0 -0.2 0 
D02M03 4166 0 1.6 0 
E01M03 4228 0 0.0 0 
E02M03 3828 0 1.9 0 
E03M03 4222 6 -2.4 0 
F02M03 2385 2652 212.7 0 
F03M03 1015 4026 311.6 -180 
F04M03 1953 1472 59.3 120 
F05M03 3270 100 21.3 0 
G01M03 5037 0 2.7 0 
H01M03 4444 0 0.0 0 
A01M04 954 4115 83.9 180 
A02M04 1198 3839 444.8 -180 
A03M04 3421 0 4.3 0 
AD1M04 4163 17 5.3 0 
B01M04 892 4177 435.3 -240 
B02M04 3806 24 6.8 0 
BH1M04 4494 0 3.9 0 
BH2M04 1628 3434 149.6 -30 
D01M04 3989 189 48.4 -180 
D01M04 5000 0 42.2 -60 
D02M04 4166 0 3.8 0 
E01M04 3544 684 95.2 -30 
E02M04 3828 0 11.1 0 
E03M04 3544 684 95.6 -30 
F02M04 1352 3685 407.4 -150 
F03M04 486 4555 34.1 510 
F04M04 3435 -10 -1.0 0 
F05M04 3265 105 19.8 0 
G01M04 1760 3277 74.6 180 
H01M04 4444 0 5.0 0 
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Table A2.1 (continued).  Results of Mitigated MMAF Simulations 
Damage 
Scenario/ 
Mitigation 
Measure 
Peak 
Damages 
(Displaced 
Persons) 
PCR 
(Displaced 
Persons) 
ACD 
(min) 
ECT 
(min) 
A01M05 5069 0 34.3 -60 
A02M05 5037 0 12.7 -30 
A03M05 3421 0 1.2 -30 
AD1M05 4180 0 22.6 -90 
B01M05 5069 0 28.4 -30 
B02M05 2332 1498 116.2 -30 
BH1M05 4494 0 3.3 -30 
BH2M05 5069 -7 30.5 -60 
D01M05 4178 0 31.3 -60 
D01M05 5000 0 17.4 -60 
D02M05 4166 0 28.0 -90 
E01M05 4222 6 22.1 -30 
E02M05 2332 1496 125.7 -60 
E03M05 4222 6 23.0 -30 
F02M05 5037 0 14.7 -30 
F03M05 5041 0 31.7 -60 
F04M05 3425 0 -0.4 -30 
F05M05 3375 -5 31.8 -90 
G01M05 5037 0 21.0 -30 
H01M05 3760 684 87.3 -90 
A01M06 951 4118 72.2 210 
A02M06 1198 3839 468.4 -210 
A03M06 3421 0 0.7 0 
AD1M06 3390 790 8.4 300 
B01M06 5069 0 10.9 -30 
B02M06 3830 0 0.1 0 
BH1M06 4494 0 0.0 0 
BH2M06 5069 -7 2.0 0 
D01M06 3994 184 48.1 -150 
D01M06 5000 0 13.9 -30 
D02M06 3390 776 6.6 300 
E01M06 3544 684 106.1 -30 
E02M06 3828 0 20.4 0 
E03M06 3544 684 94.7 -30 
F02M06 1352 3685 558.8 -330 
F03M06 486 4555 34.1 510 
F04M06 1860 1565 19.6 270 
F05M06 3270 100 21.4 0 
G01M06 5037 0 34.5 -30 
H01M06 4444 0 1.0 0 
E01M07 4228 0 0.0 0 
E02M07 3828 0 -7.6 0 
E03M07 4228 0 0.0 0 
F02M07 5037 0 33.3 -30 
F04M07 3425 0 4.4 0 
F05M07 3370 0 0.0 0 
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Fig. A2.1.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at ECO target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 45 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario G01 using various mitigation methods.  For clarity, individual data point markers are omitted.  
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Fig. A2.2.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at ECO target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 45 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario D01 using various mitigation methods. 
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Fig. A2.3.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at ECO target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 135 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario A02 using various mitigation methods. 
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Fig. A2.4.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at ECO target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 135 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario F02 using various mitigation methods. 
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Fig. A2.5.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at ECO target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 225 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario B01 using various mitigation methods. 
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Fig. A2.6.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at ECO target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 225 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario F03 using various mitigation methods. 
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Fig. A2.7.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at ECO target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 315 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario A01 using various mitigation methods. 
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Fig. A2.8.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at ECO target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 315 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario BH2 using various mitigation methods. 
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Fig. A2.9.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at GOV target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 45 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario BH1 using various mitigation methods. 
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Fig. A2.10.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at GOV target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 45 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario F04 using various mitigation methods. 
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Fig. A2.11.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at GOV target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 225 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario A03 using various mitigation methods. 
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Fig. A2.12.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at GOV target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 225 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario H01 using various mitigation methods. 
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Fig. A2.13.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at GOV target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 270 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario B02 using various mitigation methods. 
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Fig. A2.14.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at GOV target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 270 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario E02 using various mitigation methods. 
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Fig. A2.15.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at GOV target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 315 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario E01 using various mitigation methods. 
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Fig. A2.16.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at GOV target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 315 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario E03 using various mitigation methods. 
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Fig. A2.17.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at POP target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 225 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario AD1 using various mitigation methods. 
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Fig. A2.18.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at POP target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 225 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario D02 using various mitigation methods. 
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Fig. A2.19.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at POP target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 315 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario D01 using various mitigation methods. 
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Fig. A2.20.  Comparison of mitigated consequence development over time for MMAF urban fire 
originating at ECO target profile, with wind blowing 10 mph at 315 degrees and infrastructure damage 
scenario D01 using various mitigation methods. 
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